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Abstract
In this dissertation, I present three essays on matching and assignment in labor economics. The
ﬁrst chapter presents an integrated model of occupation choice, spouse choice, family labor
supply, and fertility. Two key features of the model are that occupations diﬀer both in wages
and in an amenity termed ﬂexibility, and that children require a nontrivial amount of parental
time that has no market substitute. I show that occupations with more costly ﬂexibility, modeled
as a nonlinearity in wages, have a lower fraction of women, less positive assortative mating on
earnings, and lower fertility among dual-career couples. Costly ﬂexibility may induce high-earning
couples to share home production, which rewards husbands who are simultaneously high-earning
and productive in child care. Empirical evidence broadly supports the main theoretical predictions
with respect to the tradeoﬀs between marriage market and career outcomes.
In the second chapter, I use the University of Michigan Law School Alumni Survey to in-
vestigate the interaction between assortative mating and the career and family outcomes of
high-ability women. Women with higher earnings potential at the time of law school graduation
have higher-earning spouses and more children 15 years after graduation. As the earnings penalty
from reduced labor supply decreased over the sample, women with higher-earning spouses and
more children reported shorter work weeks and were less likely to be in the labor force. Decreasing
the career cost of non-work may have the unintended result of reducing the labor supply of the
highest-ability women, as their high-earning spouses give them the option to temporarily exit the
labor force.
The third chapter addresses speciﬁcation choice in empirical peer eﬀects models. Predicting
iii
the impact of altering classroom composition on student outcomes has proven an unexpected
challenge in the experimental literature. I use the experimental data of Duﬂo et al. (2011) to
evaluate the out-of-sample predictive accuracy of popular reduced form peer eﬀects speciﬁcations.
I ﬁnd that predictions of the impact of ability tracking on outcomes are highly sensitive to
the choice of peer group summary statistics and functional form assumptions. Standard model
selection criteria provide some guidance in selecting among peer eﬀects speciﬁcations.
iv
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Chapter 1
An Integrated Model of Occupation
Choice, Spouse Choice, and Family
Labor Supply
1.1 Introduction
What does it mean to have it all? For both men and women, the canonical list includes a
successful career, an egalitarian marriage, and children. These goals are not pursued in isolation:
some are achieved in partnership with others, and all are constrained by markets. A large and es-
tablished literature has investigated the interaction of subsets of these markets, documenting, for
example, the interplay between marriage market conditions and educational investment (Angrist,
2002; Chiappori et al., 2009; Lafortune, 2010) and fertility and female labor supply (Angrist and
Evans, 1998; Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980; Nakamura and Nakamura, 1994).
In this paper I develop an integrated model of occupation choice, spouse choice, family labor
supply, and fertility that uniﬁes a broad empirical literature on career and family and provides
predictions on the relationship among occupation choice, marriage market outcomes, and female
labor supply. Building on a growing empirical literature on the career cost of family in high-earning,
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highly-educated professions, I investigate the relationship between occupational characteristics, in
particular those related to labor supply, and equilibrium sorting in the marriage market, and show
how marriage market dynamics aﬀect the decisions of women to enter high-earning, demanding
occupations and their subsequent labor supply and fertility decisions.
The literature on female occupation choice has traditionally assumed that women provide
the majority of child-related home production and focused on women's preferences for ﬂexibility,
or a set of amenities that allow for easier coordination between home production and market
work. The seminal work of Mincer and Polachek (1974) ﬁrst posited that, as secondary earners
in the family, women would select into occupations with low human capital depreciation from
child-related spells of non-work. Subsequent studies have shown the willingness of mothers to
accept lower wages in exchange for shorter hours to accommodate child-rearing responsibilities
(Blank, 1989; Altonji and Paxson, 1992; Loprest, 1992; Goldin, 2006). As women have entered
high-earning professions, they have disproportionately entered subspecialties such as dermatology
and professions such as pharmacy in which ﬂexibility is relatively inexpensive (Goldin and Katz,
2011, 2012).
Recent analyses of time use data, however, show that men, and in particular educated men,
are providing an increasing fraction of child-related home production (Guryan et al., 2008; Feyrer
et al., 2008; Ramey and Ramey, 2010). Feyrer et al. (2008) argue that this increase stems
from greater bargaining power of wives due to higher wages (see Bianchi et al. (2000) on the
relationship between wives' wages and husbands' time spent in home production). The division of
child-related home production between husbands and wives has become increasingly important as
hours in high-paying occupations for men have increased (Kuhn and Lozano, 2008) and parents
are simultaneously investing far greater amounts of time in children of all ages (Guryan et al.,
2008; Ramey and Ramey, 2010).
For women who enter inﬂexible occupations, moreover, the choice of spouse and resulting
intra-household bargaining can have substantial impacts on the long-term career cost of family.
The high cost of ﬂexibility for women in business, and in particular in ﬁnance and professional
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services, is one of the leading explanations for the substantial gender earnings gap and the paucity
of women in top positions (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Bertrand et al., 2010).1 Using detailed
retrospective data from an elite Masters of Business Administration (MBA) program, Bertrand
et al. (2010) ﬁnd that ﬁfty-seven percent of the gender earnings gap in business can be explained
by non-work spells and shorter hours, mostly due to the presence of children. However, MBA
mothers with lower-earning or less-educated spouses exhibit signiﬁcantly greater labor supply
than mothers with a high-earning or equally-educated spouse.2 Detailed individual observables
allow Bertrand et al. (2010) to rule out selection as a driver of this result, as MBA mothers are
positively selected on school performance.
I construct a two-period rational expectations model of educational investment and the mar-
riage market building on that of Chiappori et al. (2009).3 In the ﬁrst period, individuals choose
whether to invest in schooling to enter a high-earning occupation in which an occupational
amenity, ﬂexibility over labor supply, may be costly. They then make marriage, fertility, and
family labor supply decisions. The key frictions in the model stem from the interactions among
the cost of ﬂexibility, which I model as a nonlinearity in wages or the opportunity cost of time
spent on child-related home production, the demand of children for parental time that has no
market substitute, and relative productivity of husbands with respect to wives in providing this
parental time.
I ﬁrst solve for equilibrium occupation choice, marriage market outcomes, fertility, and labor
supply when ﬂexibility in the high-earning occupation is costless. When men and women have
1Additional explanations span several disciplines and include women having a distaste for competition (Niederle
and Vesterlund, 2007), an unwillingness of women to negotiate on one's own behalf for advancement (Babcock
and Laschever, 2003), and gender discrimination (Bertrand et al., 2005).
2Bertrand et al. (2010) deﬁne lower-earning as having labor market income of $200,000 per year or less.
Thus, income eﬀects alone are unlikely to explain the labor supply response documented in their work.
3Chiappori et al. (2009) propose that women now constitute the majority of college graduates due to labor
market and marriage market returns from college that exceed those of men. They introduce the two-period
framework that I build on as well as the assumption that children require some amount of home production that
has no market substitute. I augment their model by allowing for endogenous fertility and marriage market sorting,
as well as introducing occupational amenities.
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identical labor market opportunities and women have an advantage in child care production,
women always have a lower return to entering the high-earning occupation than men. The
mechanism through which this occurs depends on the available home production technology:
women in the high-earning occupation either reduce their labor supply in order to care for children;
they forgo having children and through marriage market bargaining incur most of the lost utility
from children; or they are primary breadwinners but their husbands are less productive in the
home than the wives of high-earning men.
I then introduce costly ﬂexibility in the high-earning occupation. When children require non-
trivial amounts of parental time, individuals in high-earning occupations with costlier ﬂexibility
are less likely to achieve the triad of career, family, and equal-earning spouse. Women are less
likely to enter the high-earning occupation, high-earning married couples are less likely to have
children, and high-earning individuals are less likely to marry one another. An important corol-
lary of this result is that women in high-earning occupations with costlier ﬂexibility who achieve
career and family are more likely to be married to lower-earning men or men less educated than
themselves. Decreasing the cost of ﬂexibility may simultaneously increase the fraction of women
in a high-earning occupation while decreasing their labor supply, as both fertility and positive
sorting in the marriage market become more attractive.
When ﬂexibility is costly, an equilibrium exists in which individuals in the high-earning oc-
cupation marry one another and share child care. The optimality of this arrangement follows
directly from nonlinearities in earnings: it may be less costly for high-earning fathers who are less
eﬃcient in the home to provide some child care than for the mother to purchase ﬂexibility and
provide all child care. When men vary in child care productivity, the sharing of home production
impacts the relationship between home productivity and the incentives of men to enter the high-
earning occupation. Costless ﬂexibility discourages men who are productive in the home from
entering the high-earning occupation, whereas the sharing of child care rewards husbands who
are simultaneously high-earning and productive in child care.
I present time trends from the U.S. Census and American Community Survey that support
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the predictions of my model in Section 1.8. Variation across professional occupations in women's
achievement of career and family, the fertility decisions of dual-career professional couples, and the
probability a professional woman with career and family has a less-educated husband is consistent
with the predictions of my model and estimates of the cost of ﬂexibility across high-earning
professions by others (Goldin and Katz, 2011). The fraction of dual-career professional couples
with children and the fraction of professional women achieving career and family who have
husbands less-educated than themselves have both increased over the past thirty years. This
suggests that the tradeoﬀ between positive assortative mating and career and family may become
increasingly important in future cohorts.
I build on a robust theoretical literature on marriage market matching. Becker (1973) ﬁrst
posited that equilibrium sorting in a marriage market is a function of the complementarity or sub-
stitutability of agents' traits in home production. Adding occupational time ﬂexibility in a frame-
work of marriage, fertility, and investment decisions produces predictions that diﬀer from those
stemming from changes in spot wages, which previous work had assumed (Gronau, 1977; Chiap-
pori et al., 2009). In addition, allowing for individual heterogeneity in child-related home produc-
tivity results in a rich set of marriage market equilibria and investment decisions that contributes to
a growing literature on multi-dimensional matching in marriage markets (Bergstrom and Bagnoli,
1993; Hitsch, Hortacsu and Ariely, 2010; Lee, 2011; Chiappori, Oreﬃce and Quintana-Domeque,
2010).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides an illustrative numerical example of
some of the key tradeoﬀs of the model. Section 1.3 presents the general model and equilibrium
solution concept. Section 1.4 solves the model for the case in which agents in both occupations
work in spot markets and highlights the tensions in the model among fertility, labor supply, and
occuapation choice. Section 1.5 introduces occupational amenities and key comparative statics
with respect to their cost. Section 1.6 develops a model in which agents are heterogeneous in
both schooling ability and home productivity. Section 1.7 discusses theoretical limitations of the
model and extensions for future work. Section 1.8 presents empirical evidence consistent with
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the model's predictions, and Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2 The Model Simpliﬁed: A Numerical Illustration
I ﬁrst describe a simpliﬁed numerical example that illustrates some of the basic tradeoﬀs in
the model among fertility, labor supply, marriage matching, and occupation choice. Consider a
continuum of recent college graduates, equally split between men and women, who spend two
periods making occupation, marriage market, labor supply, and fertility decisions. The agents
vary along two dimensions. Each has a cost of schooling ai ∼ U([0, amax]), which includes both
monetary and eﬀort costs and is distributed identically for men and women. amax is suﬃciently
large that the majority of individuals of each gender will always prefer not to invest in schooling.
Each agent also has a home productivity αi, which is the amount of child-related home production
he or she can complete in a unit of time. For this example, all women have home productivity
αj = 1 while all men have home productivity αi = α ∈ [0, 1].
The model has two periods (Figure 1.1). In the second period, agents participate in a
transferable-utility marriage market and make fertility and family labor supply decisions. In the
ﬁrst period, agents choose one of two occupations, Hi or Lo, in which to work in the second
period. Individuals in occupation Hi earn wages w2m = w2 f = 2 and individuals in occupation
Lo earn w1 = 1. Entering occupation Hi requires not working in occupation Lo in period 1, going
to school, and paying direct cost ai. I assume a rational expectations equilibrium; thus, agents
do not regret their occupation choices in the second period.
For this numerical example I assume the utility function of Chiappori et al. (2009): each agent
has utility
ui = ci · q
where ci is private consumption and q = e+ γ · 1K is a household public good. The household
public good is the sum of the market-purchased household public good e and the utility from
having a child γ. A couple can choose to have a child (1K = 1) or have no child (1K = 0). Agents
6
Figure 1.1: Model outline and timing.
each have a unit of time to divide between market work and child-related home production. A
child requires home production 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 which can be split between mother and father at the
couple's discretion but can be provided by no other person.4 The total cost of investment in the
ﬁrst period, including both schooling costs and forgone utility, is ai +
w2i
4 , which is distributed
identically for men and women.5 I assume that γ = 1.5 so that γ > w1.
The model is solved by backward induction, assuming the marriage market is in equilibrium
conditional on ﬁrst period occupation choices. Since utility is transferable between spouses, a
married couple consisting of man i and woman j maximizes the sum of their utilities ui+ uj in the
second period. Because the gains from children exceed the wages of individuals in occupation Lo
(γ > w1) and men's home productivity is weakly less than women's (α ≤ 1), couples including
women in occupation Lo always have a child and these wives always provide child-related home
production.6 Couples including women in occupation Hi face two decisions: whether to have a
child and, if so, which parent provides home production.
4Formally, it must hold that αhi + hj = τ where hi is time spent by the husband on child-related home
production and hj is time of the wife.
5Unmarried agents have no children, work only in the labor market, and split their income between the
household public good and private consumption.
6The opportunity cost of providing a unit of home production for women in occupation Lo is w1, which is
always weakly less than both her husband's opportunity cost (either w1α or
w2
α ) and the gain in marital public good
from having a child, γ.
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In the analysis below, I consider three sets of parameters that illustrate the range of equilibrium
matching and investment outcomes. Table 1.1 presents the career choices, marriage matching
patterns, and utility values achieved in equilibrium for each of these cases. Each set of parameters
yields a unique equilibrium in which less than half of the men choose occupation Hi by assumption
and men outnumber women in occupation Hi. Thus, some men in occupation Lo must marry
women in occupation Lo, and some men in occupation Hi must marry women in occupation Lo.
This is suﬃcient to identify equilibrium payoﬀs for men in occupation Hi and to derive the gain
in utility for men and women from investing and entering occupation Hi.7
In couples with both spouses in occupation Lo, the husband and wife have equal earning
power, but the wife provides all of the child care since she is weakly more productive in the home.
For this example I assume that the couples in occupation Lo divide marital utility equally.9 A man
in occupation Hi who marries a woman in occupation Lo generates additional marital utility due
to his higher wage. Since women in occupation Lo always provide child-related home production,
they contribute the same combination of income and home production to marriage with both
types of husbands, and the husband in occupation Hi gets to keep the additional surplus he
generates in marriage. Since some men in occupation Hi always marry women in occupation Lo,
this bargaining identiﬁes the utility received by men in occupation Hi in all cases.
In contrast, a woman in occupation Hi faces a dilemma. If men have low home productivity, a
woman in occupation Hi will either not have a child or provide all child-related home production
regardless of the occupation of her spouse. Thus, she marries the man with higher wage, and
positive assortative mating on occupation is the stable marriage matching. However, she loses
some of the beneﬁt of her high wages since she either spends part of her time in child care or
forgoes having children. If men are productive in the home, she has the choice of marrying a man
7In the general model presented in the next section, there are regions of the parameter space in which men
and women each constitute half of occupation Hi. This occurs when required home production τ is very small or
men and women are equally productive in the home (α = 1).
9I assume throughout that everyone marries. In the general model, any split of marital utility for a couple
in occupation Lo that gives both spouses at least their utility from being unmarried satisﬁes the conditions of
equilibrium.
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Table 1.1: Outcomes for Parameterized Model
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Total required home production (τ) 0.5 (Moderate) 0.5 (Moderate) 0.85 (High)
Productivity of men (α) 0.1 (Low) 0.8 (High) 0.1 (Low)
Utility of Couples
Man Hi, Woman Hi
Child, Woman Provides Care 5.06 5.06 3.61
Child, Man Provides Care8 1.82 4.52 1.00
No Child 4.00 4.00 4.00
Man Lo, Woman Hi
Child, Woman Provides Care 3.06 3.06 1.96
Child, Man Provides Care 1.82 3.75 1.00
No Child 2.25 2.25 2.25
Man Hi, Woman Lo 4.00 4.00 3.33
Man Lo, Woman Lo 2.25 2.25 1.76
Division of Utility in Second Period
Utility of Agents in Occupation Lo 1.13 1.13 0.88
Gains to Hi for Men 1.75 1.75 1.57
Utility of Men in Occupation Hi 2.88 2.88 2.45
Gains to Hi for Women
Married to Men in Occupation Hi 1.06 1.06 0.67
Married to Men in Occupation Lo 0.81 1.50 0.49
Utility of Women in Occupation Hi
Married to Men in Occupation Hi 2.19 2.19 1.55
Married to Men in Occupation Lo 1.94 2.63 1.37
Percent Occupation Hi who are Women 35% 46% 24%
Composition of Married Couples in Equilibrium Marriage Matching
Man Hi and Woman Hi 16% 0% 8%
Man Hi and Woman Lo 14% 30% 18%
Man Lo and Woman Hi 0% 25% 0%
Man Lo and Woman Lo 70% 45% 74%
Parameterization values are for the spot market model presented in Section 1.2. The wage values are w2m =
w2 f = 2 and w1 = 1 and the utility from children is γ = 1.5. The maximum cost of schooling used to compute the
distribution of couples is aMAX = 5. Bold indicates the choice of fertility and home production that maximizes
the utility of the couple or the marriage market equilibrium that maximizes total surplus.
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in occupation Hi and still providing home production (or not having a child) or marrying a man
in occupation Lo who will provide child care and allow her to work full time in the market. If
men are suﬃciently productive in the home, she marries the man in occupation Lo and negative
assortative mating is the stable marriage matching. However, if her husband is less productive
in the home than a woman in occupation Lo, their total marital utility is less than a couple in
which the man is in occupation Hi and the woman in occupation Lo.
For the parameter values in Table 1.1, therefore, a high-wage woman always provides less
incremental surplus to a marriage with either type of spouse than does a high-wage man marrying
a woman in occupation Lo. Women receive less utility from entering occupation Hi than men, and
thus there are fewer women than men in occupation Hi for each of the three sets of parameter
values. Although women are more productive in the home and have equal nominal costs and
wage beneﬁts from entering occupation Hi, they achieve lower utility in equilibrium in each case.
• Case 1: α = 0.1 (Low), τ = 0.5 (Moderate)
In Case 1, required home production is moderate and men have relatively low home productivity.
Women in occupation Hi provide greater incremental utility by marrying men in occupation Hi
(from which they obtain utility 2.19) than by marrying men in occupation Lo (from which they
obtain utility 1.94), so positive assortative mating is the stable marriage matching. The gain in
second period utility from a woman entering occupation Hi is 1.06 and the gain for men is 1.75. All
individuals who have a cost of investment less than or equal to these values enter occupation Hi.10
Women constitute about a third of the individuals in occupation Hi, and therefore approximately
half of the men in occupation Hi marry women in occupation Hi.
• Case 2: α = 0.8 (High), τ = 0.5 (Moderate)
In Case 2, required home production remains moderate, but men are more productive in the home
than in Case 1. Men have the same payoﬀs and gains from investment as in Case 1. However,
men in occupation Lo now provide child care in marriages with women in occupation Hi. Thus,
10Recall that the cost of investment ai+
w21
4 includes both the individual cost of schooling and forgone earnings.
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women have both greater incentive to marry men in occupation Lo and to choose occupation Hi.
Negative assortative mating is the resulting marriage market equilibrium: each person choosing
occupation Hi marries a spouse in occupation Lo. Since women in occupation Hi work full-time
in the market and men are productive in the home, women in occupation Hi achieve only slightly
lower utility than men in occupation Hi. Men still outnumber women in occupation Hi, but
women constitute a higher fraction of occupation Hi (46%) than in Case 1 (35%).
• Case 3: α = 0.1 (Low), τ = 0.85 (High)
In Case 3, home productivity of men returns to its original low level, but the required level of
home production increases compared to Case 1. The opportunity cost of child care in this case
is so high that women in occupation Hi choose to remain childless. Thus, the high wages that
women in occupation Hi bring to marriage are oﬀset by the loss of utility from children, and
women in occupation Hi are not much more attractive spouses than women in occupation Lo.
Positive assortative mating is the stable marriage matching, and there is minimal incentive for
women to choose occupation Hi. The fraction of women in occupation Hi (8%) is less than in
Case 1 (14%).
This simple example illustrates some of the key dynamics of the model. In these three exam-
ples, women in occupation Hi spend part of their time in child care, forgo children, or outsource
home production to men less eﬃcient in the home than women.11 Thus, they always receive less
surplus from entering occupation Hi than men, who reap the full beneﬁt from their increased
wage. A decrease in required home production τ or an increase in men's home productivity α
increases the gains to entering occupation Hi for women by altering fertility decisions, the division
of home production within the family, and the equilibrium marriage matching.
The remainder of the paper explores the impact of changes in wages (Section 1.4) and the
costs of occupational amenities (Section 1.5) on the investment and marriage market dynamics
presented in this example. When individuals are heterogeneous in home productivity within
11The symmetric case in which α = 1 is considered in the general model.
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gender (see Section 1.6), women in occupation Hi may marry men in both occupation Lo and Hi
in equilibrium even if they are outnumbered in occupation Hi, which corresponds more closely to
empirical patterns presented in Section 1.8.
1.3 The Model
In this section I present the general model and equilibrium concept. The timing of the model is
the same as outlined in Section 1.2 and in Figure 1.1. I again assume that there are a unit mass
of men and a unit mass of women who diﬀer in both their ability in schooling ai and their home
productivity αi. Individuals may diﬀer in home productivity between and within genders due to
a combination of physiological diﬀerences, individual skill in and enjoyment of home production,
social or cultural norms (Fernández et al., 2004), biological constraints on fertility (Siow, 1998),
or the available home production technology (Greenwood et al., 2005). Proofs of all results are
provided in Appendix A.
1.3.1 Family Production and Marital Surplus Division
I assume a transferable utility marriage market as in the seminal work of Becker (1973). The
appropriateness of transferable utility in modeling family decision-making is a topic of active
debate (see e.g. Lundberg and Pollak., 1996; Ashraf, 2009). Nonetheless, it is attractive in
this setting for two reasons. First, it ensures that the marriage market equilibrium is unique,
whereas when utility is non-transferable there may be many stable marriage matchings (Roth and
Sotomayor, 1992). The division of marital surplus in a transferable utility framework via ex post
bargaining provides clear intuition for the role of bargaining in surplus division without needing
to model the relative bargaining power of the two sides of the market (Chiappori, 1992).
12
1.3.1.1 Utility of Individuals and Couples
By a classic result of Bergstrom (1989), a necessary and suﬃcient condition for transferable utility
in a matching market is that agents have generalized quasi-linear utility.12 I assume utility of this
form with one marital public good q and one private good ci
ui = ci · G(q) = ci · G(e+ γ · 1K) (1.1)
where G(q) is increasing and concave.13 As in Section 1.2, the marital public good q is equal to
the sum of a market-purchased public good e and utility from a child γ if a couple chooses to
have one (1K = 1).
Because utility is transferable, a married couple with woman i and man j maximize the sum
of their utilities ηij = max{ui + uj}. The following proposition is standard in the literature (see
e.g. Chiappori et al. (2007)).
Proposition 1. When agents have utility of the form in Equation 1.1, the total utility of married
couple consisting of man i and woman j can be written as ηij = f (Wi +Wj + γ · 1K) where f
is increasing and convex and Wi +Wj is the total income of the couple.
Single individuals cannot have a child, and their utility is ηi,0 = f (Wi) where Wi is individual
i's income.
The total utility of a married couple ηij satisﬁes
∂2Zij
∂Wi∂Wj
> 0, which is the classic Becker
condition for positive assortative mating on earnings (Becker, 1973). All else equal, high-earning
and highly-educated individuals prefer to marry one another in the marriage market equilibrium.
This assumption is consistent with the extensive literature documenting the increase in educational
homogamy in the United States over the past sixty years (Blossfeld and Timm, eds, 2003; Schwartz
and Mare, 2005; Mare, 1991; Rose, 2001).
12Generalized quasi-linear utility has the form ui(ci, q) = fi(ci−1, q) + c
i
1G(q) where c
i is a vector of n private
goods, q is a vector of m marital public goods, G and f are positive, increasing, concave functions, G(0) = 1,
and fi(0) = 0, and qi1 > 0 for all i (Chiappori et al., 2007).
13Because I consider only equilibria where all agents marry, I am not interested in individual variation in the
utility from marriage. Thus, I normalize the individual portion of the utility function to fi(q) = 0.
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In a transferable utility marriage market, bargaining power arises endogenously after the unique
equilibrium is determined. For marriage to be individually rational, each individual must get at
least his outside option, which is the utility from being single. Thus, agents bargain to split the
marital surplus
Zij = ηij − ηi,0 − ηj,0.
1.3.1.2 Labor Supply and Fertility Decisions
In each period, each agent has a unit of time to divide between home production and work. All
non-child-related home production can be purchased in the market, so only couples with children
must make labor supply and home production decisions. A couple can choose whether to have
a child. If the couple has a child, the spouses are required between them to supply total home
production τ ∈ [0, 1]. Any additional parental time has no additional beneﬁt for the child, and
thus any time not spent producing τ is spent in the labor market.
Unlike much of the literature on family labor supply and the market for child care, I do not
allow parental time spent on child care to be a function of wages or the price and quality of
child care available in the market (e.g. Blau and Hagy, 1998). My assumption that there is a
ﬁxed requirement for parental time that is independent of wages (conditional on having a child)
captures the intuition that there is some portion of child care that cannot be outsourced to the
market at any price. Empirical evidence does not dispute this assumption: time use data shows
that educated parents have increased the time spent with their children even as their wages have
risen and as time spent on other forms of home production has decreased (Aguiar and Hurst,
2007; Guryan et al., 2008).14
Because marital surplus is increasing in the total income of the family, a couple with a child will
choose the labor supply that maximizes total earnings. Let Wi(t) be the earnings of individual
i when he or she works time t in the market. A family of man i and woman j with home
14A more nuanced model that allows child quality to vary with parental time and the quality of market-purchased
child care would be an interesting future endeavor.
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productivities αi and αj and with a child thus has total income
W∗i +W
∗
j ≡ arg maxti,tj∈[0,1]Wi(ti) +Wj(tj)
s.t. (1− ti)αi + (1− tj)αj = τ
When both agents work in a spot market and earn wages wi and wj, all home production is
provided by the agent with comparative advantage in home production, or a lower opportunity
cost of time wα .
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A couple chooses to have a child if f (W∗i +W
∗
j + γ) ≥ f (Wi +Wj), where Wi = Wi(1)
is individual i′s earnings when working full-time in the labor market, or equivalently if the utility
from a child is greater than the labor market opportunity cost (γ >Wi +Wj −W∗i −W∗j ).
1.3.1.3 Equilibrium Matching and Marital Surplus Division
Following the literature on matching with transferable utility (Shapley and Shubik, 1971; Becker,
1973; Chiappori et al., 2009), I assume the marriage market equilibrium condition of stability.
Shapley and Shubik (1971) prove that a matching in a transferable-utility marriage market is
stable if and only if it maximizes total utility in the matching market.16 When one side of the
marriage market consists of only two types of men or of women, it is straightforward to show
that a matching is stable if for all couples ij and kl matched in the stable matching,
ηij + ηkl ≥ ηil + ηkj
After the stable matching is determined, the split of marital surplus between husband and wife
arises endogenously via market bargaining power. Let Ui be the portion of the marital surplus
Zij given to the husband in pairing ij and Vj be the surplus given to the wife. For there to be no
blocking pairs, it must be that
15If αi < τ, agent i may exhaust his time allocation and still not complete all home production. In this case, the
other spouse completes the remaining home production. Formally, we require the assumption that τ < αi + αj.
In practice, τ will always be less than the home productivity of the least productive woman.
16Let M be the set of men, W be the set of women, and ∅ be unassigned. A matching is a pair of mappings
µ : M→ {W ∪∅} and ν : W → {M ∪∅} such that µ(m) = w if and only if ν(w) = m.
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Figure 1.2: Two possible marriage market equilibria: positive assortative mating (left) and negative
assortative mating (right).
Ui +Vj ≥ Zij (1.2)
for all couples ij with equality if i and j are matched to each other in the stable matching (Shapley
and Shubik, 1971; Becker, 1973; Chiappori et al., 2009). In order for everyone to marry, marriage
must be individually rational for all agents, or that Ui ≥ 0 and Vj ≥ 0. Because couples in the
model can choose not to have a child, there is always a surplus division in equilibrium in which
marriage is individually rational for all agents.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the two possible equilibrium marriage matchings in the special case
in which agents are diﬀerentiated only by their occupation and men in occupation Hi weakly
outnumber women in occupation Hi.17 When positive assortative mating is the marriage market
equilibrium, individuals in occupation Hi marry and individuals in occupation Lo marry. If there is
a surplus of individuals in occupation Hi of one gender, they marry individuals in occupation Lo
of the other gender. If negative assortative mating on occupation is the equilibrium matching, all
individuals in occupation Hi marry individuals in occupation Lo and the remaining individuals in
17Recall that an assumption of the model is that a minority of agents of each gender invest in schooling to
enter occupation Hi.
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occupation Lo marry.
The system of inequalities deﬁned by Equation 1.2 gives a unique solution to the gains in
marital surplus from entering occupation Hi for both men and women. However, the total
utility received by agents in the market may not be uniquely identiﬁed. For example, when
home productivity does not vary within gender as in Section 1.2, any division of surplus between
couples in occupation Lo satisfying UL +VL = ZLL with UL, VL ≥ 0 satisﬁes the conditions for
equilibrium. The fraction of ZLL received by men can be thought of as the degree to which the
market favors men but does not impact equilibrium marriage market outcomes, fertility decisions,
or occupation choices.
A key characteristic of this endogenous surplus division is that agents who are relatively scarce
in the market have bargaining power and extract additional surplus they create in the match. If
women in occupation Hi outnumber men in occupation Hi and positive assortative matching is
stable, for example, women in occupation Hi keep the surplus that they generate in a match
in occupation Hi above the surplus generated by the same man when matched with a woman
in occupation Lo. When agents vary within gender in both occupation and home productivity,
agents with high home productivity keep the additional surplus they generate from their home
production eﬃciency when they are scarce.
1.3.2 Occupation Choice
In the ﬁrst period, agents choose the occupation Hi or Lo. Occupation Lo requires no
investment in schooling: agents work in a spot market in both periods 1 and 2 for the hours
of their choosing and earn a constant wage w1. Alternatively, agents can invest in a period of
schooling in period 1, forgoing wages and paying cost ai, and enter occupation Hi. The earnings of
men and women in occupation Hi are strictly higher than those of men and women in occupation
Lo for all amounts of labor supplied (Wi(t) > w1 · t for all values of t) but Wi may include
nonlinearities. Section 1.5.1 presents a stylized framework for Wi(t) when ﬂexibility is costly.
Let ηL be the utility of an unmarried individual in occupation Lo, ηiH,0 be the utility of an
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unmarried male in occupation Hi, and ai be man i's cost of schooling. Ui,H and Ui,L are the
marital surplus received by a man with home productivity αi in occupations Hi and Lo, respectively.
Man i chooses to invest and enter occupation Hi if the total utility from investment is greater
than or equal to the total utility from not investing and working in the ﬁrst period.
Ui,H + ηiH,0 − ai ≥ 2ηL +Ui,L
The expression for women is analogous.18 Note that this deﬁnes a cutoﬀ cost of schooling a∗i
such for all men with home production αi, men with ai ≤ a∗i invest and enter occupation Hi and
all others remain in occupation Lo.
1.3.3 Equilibrium
In a rational expectations equilibrium, agents need to correctly anticipate both the labor market
and marriage market returns to each occupation. The marriage market returns are in turn a
function of the occupations chosen by individuals in the market, as the division of marital surplus
depends on the distribution of earnings-home producitivity pairs on each side of the marriage
market. The conditions for equilibrium are thus as follows:
1. Given the utility in each occupation Ui,L + 2ηi,L and Ui,H + ηiH,0 for each individual i,
all individuals choose the occupation that provides higher utility. An indiﬀerent individual
enters occupation Hi.
2. Given the occupation choices of individuals in period 1, the marriage market equilibrium is
stable.
Note that, as discussed in Subsection 1.3.1.3, the utility received by agents in equilibrium may
not be uniquely identiﬁed. However, the marriage market matching is unique, and the system of
equations generated by the inequalities 1.2 uniquely identiﬁes the gain in utility for each agent
from entering occupation Hi thus equilibrium occupation choices.
18There is no time discounting.
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1.4 Occupations as Spot Markets
I assume for this section that both professions oﬀer only spot market work with w2m ≥ w2 f >
γ > w1 where γ is the marital public good from a child. The assumption of spot market work is
standard in the literature on family labor supply (Gronau, 1977).19 The diﬀerence between the
wages of men and women in occupation Hi may be due to a variety of non-labor-supply factors.
Women may face discrimination (Bertrand et al., 2005), have a lower propensity to negotiate for
pay (Babcock and Laschever, 2003), or may have a lower level of unobservable skill (Blau and
Kahn, 2000).
I again assume that women and men diﬀer between, but not within, genders in home produc-
tivity. All men have home productivity αi = α and all women have home productivity αj = 1.
Note that while I allow for gender asymmetries in home production or market wage, the model
nests the symmetric special case α = 1 and w2 f = w2m.
The following results illustrate the tradeoﬀs between spouse choice, fertility, and family labor
supply and generalize the intuition presented in the numerical example in Section 1.2.
Lemma 1. When men in occupation Lo never have a comparative advantage in home production
(α ≤ w1w2 f ), positive assortative matching is the stable outcome.
While the mathematical proof is immediate, I highlight Lemma 1 as a result that is both useful
for intuition and used repeatedly in proofs that follow. It captures a straightforward observation:
in the absence of a reduction in the opportunity cost of a child from marrying down, the
complementarities between individuals in occupation Hi make positive assortative matching the
stable marriage market outcome. Women in occupation Lo always have a comparative advantage
in home production, so the set of parameters for which Lemma 1 holds is deﬁned by when men
in occupation Lo do not have a comparative advantage in home production relative to women in
occupation Hi.
19To ensure that there are always some women who invest and enter occupation Hi, I assume w2 f is suﬃciently
large that ηLL − ηLA > ηA and ηAL − ηAA > ηA. The simulation parameters used in Section 1.2 satisfy these
inequalities.
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1.4.1 Equilibrium Marriage Matching, Fertility, and Labor Supply
Theorem 1 gives the key matching, labor supply, and fertility dynamics of the model when agents
in both occupations work in spot markets. This generalizes the example in Section 1.2.
Theorem 1. Fix wages and gains from children γ, and let w2m ≥ w2 f > γ > w1.
1. There is a continuous function αˆ(τ) such that for α > αˆ(τ), negative assortative matching
on occupation is the stable marriage matching. In this region, all individuals in occupation
Hi marry individuals in occupation Lo and all home production is provided by men and
women in occupation Lo. For τ > γw2 f and α ≤ αˆ, there is positive assortative matching
on occupation but women in occupation Hi do not have a child. For τ ≤ γw2 f and α ≤ αˆ,
the stable matching is positive assortative on occupation, all couples have a child, and all
home production is provided by women.
2. αˆ is increasing in τ when women in occupation Hi do not have a child. When the derivative
of the surplus function, f ′, is convex, αˆ is decreasing in τ for τ ≤ γw2 f .
Figure 1.3 shows the equilibrium marriage, fertility, and labor supply decisions as a function of
total home production required by children τ and home productivity of men α for wage parameters
w2m = 2, w2 f = 1.8, γ = 1.5, and w1 = 1.
When men are highly productive in the home (α is large), near gender symmetry is achieved. If
total production required τ is small, women have a high opportunity cost of providing childcare,
but τ is suﬃciently small that it is still optimal for high earners to marry each other and for
women in occupation Hi and women in occupation Lo to provide home production. When τ is
large, the opportunity cost of women in occupation Hi providing childcare is suﬃciently large that
it is optimal for both men and women in occupation Hi to marry men and women in occupation
Lo so they can work full-time in the labor market.
When women always have comparative advantage in the home (α is low), women provide all
child-related home production. If the total time required for a child is large, women in occupation
Hi forgo having a child. As the time required for children decreases, the gain from children
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Figure 1.3: Equilibrium matching, labor supply, and fertility decisions in the spot market model as a
function of home production parameters. Wage and child utility parameters are w2m = 2, w2 f = 1.8,
γ = 1.5, and w1 = 1.
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outweighs the opportunity cost of their care, and women in occupation Hi have children and
spend the remainder of their time in the labor market.
The negative derivative of αˆ when women in occupation Hi have a child documents the tradeoﬀ
between time required for childcare and spouse substitutability: the larger the opportunity cost
for a woman in occupation Hi to raise a child, the more willing are men and women Hi to marry
lower-earning spouses so that they can both spend their time in the labor market. The suﬃcient
condition that the derivative of the total utility function, f ′, is convex recalls the literature on
precautionary savings (Kimball, 1990), although ours is not a necessary condition. It captures
the intuition that the gains from positive assortative mating on earnings must be suﬃciently
large, or equivalently that f is suﬃciently convex. The utility speciﬁcation used in Section 1.2
is on the boundary of satisfying this condition: the utility of a married couple is quadratic in total
income and thus has a zero second derivative.
Theorem 1 captures intuition from two strands of the marriage market literature. The negative
slope of the cutoﬀ between positive and negative assortative mating αˆ follows the insight of
Becker (1973) that the equilibrium of a marriage market is a function of the tradeoﬀ between
complementarity and substitutability of spouses in producing marital surplus. I also formalize and
generalize the comment of Chiappori et al. (2009) that a switch from the social norm that women
always provide childcare to an equitable norm in which men and women are equally eﬃcient in
home production introduces negative assortative matching for suﬃciently large values of required
home production τ.
1.4.2 Investment and the Gender Ratio in the High-Earning Occu-
pation
To complete the equilibrium, I need to verify that the surplus division from the marriage market is
consistent with the investment decisions made by agents in the ﬁrst period of the model. When
home productivity diﬀers only by gender, marriage market surplus is a function of occupation and
gender, and thus the equilibrium surplus division depends only on the ratio of men in occupation
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Hi to women in occupation Hi. Theorem 2 solves for the ratio of men to women in occupation
Hi as a function of the underlying home production parameters and wages and veriﬁes that it is
consistent with the equilibrium division of marital surplus.
Theorem 2. Men in occupation Hi always weakly outnumber women in occupation Hi. The
fraction of individuals in occupation Hi who are women is minimized when τ = γw2 f and positive
assortative matching is stable. This fraction is increasing in α, increasing in τ when women
in occupation Hi do not have a child and positive assortative matching is stable, and weakly
decreasing in τ when they do have a child and the derivative f ′ is convex.
Because home production ability does not vary within gender, the fraction of women in
occupation Hi is given by
FW =
a∗j
a∗i + a
∗
j
where a∗j is the cutoﬀ cost of schooling below which women enter occupation Hi and a
∗
i is the
equivalent cutoﬀ for men. The fraction of individuals in occupation Hi who are women is shown
in Figure 1.4 for wage values w2m = 2, w2 f = 1.8, γ = 1.5, and w1 = 1.
A suﬃcient assumption for men in occupation Hi to weakly outnumber women in occupation
Hi is that men are weakly less eﬃcient in home production than women. Because there are thus
always men in both occupation Hi and occupation Lo who marry women in occupation Lo, men's
gains to entering occupation Hi are always given by ηLA − ηAA − ηA. This is only a function of
the wage of men in occupation Hi, w2m, the wage of individuals in occupation Lo, w1, and the
total required child-related home production τ.
The gains to entering occupation Hi for women are a more complicated function of fertility
decisions and home production parameters. When positive assortative matching is stable, the
gains to investment for women are a function of both the time required for home production τ
and the decision to have a child. When negative assortative matching is stable, women's gains
to investment are increasing in the home productivity of men. The gains to entering occupation
Hi, excluding individual cost parameters, are shown in Figure 1.5 for both men and women.
23
Figure 1.4: Fraction of Occupation Hi who are women in the spot market model as a function of home
production parameters. Wage and child utility parameters are w2m = 2, w2 f = 1.8, γ = 1.5, and
w1 = 1.
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Figure 1.5: Utility gains to entering Occupation Hi by gender in the spot market model as a function
of home production parameters. Wage and child utility parameters are w2m = 2, w2 f = 1.8, γ = 1.5,
and w1 = 1.
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When men and women in occupation Hi receive the same wage (w2m = w2 f ), for symmetric
home productivity (α = 1) or for τ small, the unique equilibrium is for an equal number of
men and women to enter occupation Hi. In this case, if positive assortative mating is the stable
marriage matching, agents in occupation Hi split marital surplus equally. This equilibrium persists
if women's wages in occupation Hi are suﬃciently close to men's and τ is small. For more on
this equilibrium, see Chiappori et al. (2009).
In the region of the parameter space in which women in occupation Hi have no child, an
increase in required childcare time τ increases the incentives for women to enter occupation
Hi. As τ increases, women in occupation Lo must invest more time in childcare and reduce their
market work while women in occupation Hi are unaﬀected. This increases the surplus that women
in occupation Hi bring to marriage and receive in bargaining.
1.4.3 Impact of Wage Changes on Equilibrium Matching and In-
vestment
There is a subtle comparative static eﬀect of a change in wage on the equilibrium marriage market
and investment decisions. While an increase in the wages of men in occupation Hi unambiguously
increases the region in which positive assortative matching is stable, the impact of an increase in
the wages of women in occupation Hi depends on the wage diﬀerence between men in occupation
Hi and occupation Lo.
Theorem 3. An increase in the wages of men in occupation Hi, w2m, increases the cutoﬀ
for negative assortative mating αˆ. An increase in the spot wage of women in occupation Hi 1)
increases the region in which women in occupation Hi have no children and 2) decreases the
cutoﬀ for negative assortative mating αˆ if τ ≤ γw2 f and
∂ fLL
w2 f
< ∂ fALw2 f . An increase in the wages
of women in occupation Hi increase the fraction of individuals in occupation Hi who are women.
An increase in the spot wage of women in occupation Hi produces dynamics similar to those
described by Feyrer et al. (2008): more women invest and enter occupation Hi, and fertility of
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women in occupation Hi decreases if men do not participate in home production. The impact on
the marriage market equilibrium is ambiguous: while the opportunity cost of children increases
and thus negative assortative mating is more attractive, higher spot wages also increase the
complementarities between high earners. Which eﬀect dominates is a function of the wage
diﬀerence between men in occupation Hi and in occupation Lo and the convexity of f , the utility
function of married couples.
Note that an increase in women's wages w2 f unambiguously increases the utility of women
in occupation Hi.
1.5 Adding Occupational Amenities
1.5.1 Modeling Flexibility
Models of family labor supply and educational investment traditionally assume that agents face
a spot labor market (Gronau, 1977), and that an investment in education results in a higher
future spot market wage. I expand this framework to include a stylized model of an occupational
amenity in the spirit of Rosen (1986). Formally, the high-paying occupation (Hi) will exhibit
nonlinear opportunity costs of time from child-related home production. Colloquially, I refer to
this disamenity as inﬂexibility.
I model ﬂexibility as follows: individuals who have invested to become Hi have a choice of two
types of work. The ﬁrst option is for Hi to work in ﬁrms. Workers in ﬁrms are more productive;
however, in order to reap the beneﬁts of working in ﬁrm, the worker must provide minimum
labor supply b or higher. The wages paid by the ﬁrm are w2m for men and w2 f for women
with w2m ≥ w2 f > γ > w1. If the worker cannot fulﬁll the requirement for hours b, she works
in the spot market. To compensate for the disamenity of imposing a minimum hours of work,
ﬁrms compensate workers with wage ∆ above the spot market wage. Individuals in occupation
Hi always make more than individuals in occupation Lo, or w2 f − ∆ > w1. Formally, earnings in
occupation Hi as a function of time worked t, Wi(t), are now a piecewise linear function. For
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Figure 1.6: Earnings as a function of labor supply for Occupation Hi and Occupation Lo.
women, they are
Wj(tj) =

w2 f · tj if tj ≥ b
(w2 f − ∆) · tj if tj < b
(1.3)
and similarly for men. The decrease in wage at the point b induces a discrete jump in earnings
of size ∆b. An illustration of earnings as a function of time is given in Figure 1.6.
The discrete cost of ﬂexibility b∆ in this stylized model reﬂects career costs of family that are
not proportional to labor supply. Goldin and Katz (2011) ﬁnd substantial variation in the mag-
nitude of these nonlinearities among mothers in medicine, business, and law; these are discussed
further in Section 1.8.
A functional form that results in substantively similar results is one in which ﬁrms pay women
w2 f g(ti) and men w2mg(ti) where g is increasing and concave, g−1(0) > 0, and g′(1) >
1. Such a functional form could arise from a combination of ﬁxed costs and substantial (but
decreasing) learning by doing.20 I assume the functional form in Equation 1.3 because it allows
20The one substantive diﬀerence is that for α close to 1 and w2 f close to w2m, the concave function w2ig(ti)
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for straightforward comparative statics with respect to b and ∆.
1.5.2 Optimal Labor Supply of Couples
Introducing the occupational amenity ﬂexibility substantially complicates the optimal labor supply
and equilibrium matching of the market but gives important insight in to the relationship between
occupational characteristics, home production technology, and marriage market outcomes. The-
orem 4 proves that the nonlinearities in earnings introduced by occupational amenities can result
in high-earning couples sharing child-related home production. To capture the intuition that b
represents a long-hours job, I assume here that the minimum hours at the ﬁrm b is suﬃciently
large such that if two individuals in occupation Hi can share childcare and still work in the ﬁrm,
they do so.21
Theorem 4. When ∆ > 0, there are values of (τ, α) such that the optimal labor supply of couples
that include women in occupation Hi is to share home production with men in occupation Hi or
men in occupation Lo. The area of the (τ, α) parameter space in which sharing is optimal is
increasing in the cost of ﬂexibility ∆.
The discrete jump in the budget constraint for women in occupation Hi implies that it can be
income-maximizing for men and women to share childcare responsibilities even when the woman
has a comparative advantage in home production (Figure 1.7). The husband contributes to home
production until the higher opportunity cost of his time from the combination of higher wages
and lower home productivity is no longer outweighed by the discrete loss of earnings from the
woman purchasing ﬂexibility.
A decrease in the minimum eﬀective hours of ﬁrms b has an interesting two-fold eﬀect for high-
earning couples near the cutoﬀ between sharing home production and having the woman purchase
results in more equal sharing of home production than does the functional form Wj(tj) in which women always
provide home production up to τ = b before men provide any home production.
21In Appendix A, I show that the condition for this to hold is b ≥ w2 f+w2m−γw2 f+w2m .
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Figure 1.7: Optimal labor supply and time on home production for a couple in Occupation Hi when
ﬂexibility is costless (left) and costly (right).
ﬂexibility: a decrease in b can result in a decrease in men's labor supply. This occurs when the
couple switches from having the woman purchase ﬂexibility and provide all home production to
the couple sharing home production and both working in a ﬁrm.
1.5.3 Impact of Costly Flexibility on Equilibrium Matching, Fertility,
and Occupation Choice
Theorems 5 and 6 are two of the main results of the paper. An increase in the cost of ﬂexibility ∆
has three main eﬀects on marriage patterns, fertility, and occupation choice. Theorem 5 derives
the comparative statics with respect to fertility and equilibrium marriage patterns. Increasing
∆ decreases the threshold αˆ for negative assortative mating when women lawyers work in the
spot market. An increase in ∆ also increases the region of the parameter space in which women
Hi have no children. This shift occurs on two margins: an increase in the cost of ﬂexibility ∆
increases the career cost of family for high-earning couples, thus reducing their fertility, and also
results in a shift from negative assortative mating with children to positive assortative mating
with couples in occupation Hi having no children.
Theorem 5. An increase in the gains to ﬁrm work ∆ decreases the cutoﬀ for negative assortative
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Figure 1.8: Equilibrium marriage matching, labor supply, and fertility when ﬂexibility is costly as a
function of home production parameters. Wage and child utility parameters are w2m = 2, w2 f = 1.8,
γ = 1.5, w1 = 1, ∆ = 0.2, and b = 0.9.
mating αˆ when women in occupation Hi work in the spot market and men in occupation Lo have
time budget constraints that are not binding. An increase in the gains to ﬁrm work ∆ increases
the region in which women in occupation Hi have no child.
Figure 1.8 shows the equilibrium marriage, fertility, and labor supply outcomes with wages
w2m = 2, w2 f = 1.8, γ = 1.5, and w1 = 1. The cost of ﬂexibility is ∆ = 0.2 and the minimum
labor supply for the ﬁrm is b = 0.9. Comparing Figure 1.8 with Figure 1.3 shows the impact of
costly ﬂexibility on the equilibrium set of outcomes.
Theorem 6 completes this set of results by examining the impact of an increase in the cost of
ﬂexibility ∆ on equilibrium occupation choice. An increase in ∆ decreases the gains to entering
occupation Hi for women when women in occupation Hi work in the spot market and does not
impact the gains to entering occupation Hi for men. Thus, an increase in ∆ unambiguously
decreases the fraction of women in the high-paying occupation when women in occupation Hi
work in the spot market.
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Figure 1.9: Decrease in fraction Occupation Hi who are women when ﬂexibility is costly compared to
costless ﬂexibility as a function of home production parameters. Wage and child utility parameters are
w2m = 2, w2 f = 1.8, γ = 1.5, w1 = 1, ∆ = 0.2, and b = 0.9 for costly ﬂexibility and ∆ = 0 for costless
ﬂexibility.
Theorem 6. Men in occupation Hi weakly outnumber women in occupation Hi. An increase in
∆ decreases the fraction of individuals in occupation Hi who are women when positive assortative
mating is the stable matching and women in occupation Hi work in the spot market.
Figure 1.9 shows the decrease in the fraction of women in occupation Hi when the cost of
ﬂexibility is increased from ∆ = 0 to ∆ = 0.2. Wages are w2m = 2, w2 f = 1.8, γ = 1.5, and
w1 = 1 and the minimum labor supply in the ﬁrm is b = 0.9.
1.5.4 Comparison of Changes in Wages and Costs of Flexibility
Comparing Theorems 5 and 6 with Theorem 3 makes clear the diﬀerence between the impact
of spot wage changes and the impact of changes in the prices of amenities on marriage market,
investment, and fertility decisions. An increase in the spot wage of women in occupation Hi in-
creases both the opportunity cost of children and complementarities between high-earning women
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and men. More women enter occupation Hi and the labor supply of these women (almost always)
increases, both through decreased fertility and more negative sorting in the marriage market.
An increase in the cost of ﬂexibility, however, impacts equilibrium outcomes only through
the opportunity cost of children. Decreasing ∆ increases the utility of women in occupation Hi
and the incentives of women to enter the high-paying occupation. However, it also results in
more positive assortative mating among individuals in occupation Hi and higher fertility. Thus,
a decrease in the cost of ﬂexibility ∆ may result in a decrease in the labor supply of women in
occupation Hi as they switch from roles as primary breadwinners or members of childless couples
to childcare providers with husbands in occupation Hi.
1.5.5 Impact of Changes in Hours Requirement b on Occupation
Choice
While the model for the hours threshold b is not microfounded, it is still useful to contrast the
impact of a change in ∆ on investment incentives of women with a change in b. An exogenous
decrease in b might be due to improvements in telecommunitions technology which allow agents
to complete the same amount of work with fewer hours at the ﬁrm (Autor, 2001).
Theorem 7. A decrease in required hours b increases the fraction of individuals in occupation
Hi who are women only if women in occupation Hi share home production with their husbands.
A decrease in b results in a shift of home production to the wife if she was previously providing
the minimum labor supply required by the ﬁrm. This increases the utility of high-earning couples
since women in occupation Hi have a weakly lower opportunity cost of time when sharing is the
optimal division of home production. This results in more women investing to enter occupation
Hi and also makes positive assortative mating a more attractive outcome. A decrease in minimum
labor supply b thus impacts the fraction of women in occupation Hi for a diﬀerent set of parameter
values than does a decrease in the cost of ﬂexibility ∆ : decreasing b increases the utility of women
in occupation Hi when they just miss the cutoﬀ for working in the ﬁrm, whereas decreasing ∆
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increases the utility of women in occupation Hi for women not close to the minimum hours
required by the ﬁrm.
1.6 Adding Heterogeneity in Home Production Ability
Finally, I consider a stylized example in which men are heterogeneous in home production eﬃ-
ciency. When agents are heterogeneous in home productivity within gender, schooling ability and
home productivity jointly determine optimal marriage and occupation decisions. The introduc-
tion of occupational amenities has an interesting, subtle eﬀect on the interaction of these two
parameters in occupation choice.
Assume that a small fraction of men q are endowed with high home productivity α′ ≤ 1 and
the remaining fraction 1− q have home productivity 0 ≤ α < α′ ≤ 1. Home productivity is
distributed independently of schooling ability. All women continue to have home productivity
α f = 1.
Theorem 8. 1. Assume that agents in both occupations work in spot markets. If negative
assortative mating is the stable matching for men with high home productivity (α′ > αˆ from
Theorem 1) and q is suﬃciently small, then the fraction of men with high α (αm = α′) who
invest and enter occupation Hi is less than the fraction of men with low α (αm = α) who
invest. The disparity in investment is increasing in α′ and increasing in w2 f if
∂ fLL
w2 f
< ∂ fALw2 f .
2. If τ,α, and α′ are such that positive assortative mating with sharing of home production is
the equilibrium outcome, the fraction of men with α′ investing to enter occupation Hi is
higher than the fraction of men with α who invest.
When men with high home productivity are scarce, they have a disincentive to enter occupation
Hi, as they obtain surplus from providing home production for high-earning women and capture
the gain in utility their high productivity generates. Spot markets thus encourage specialization
in home or work. When high-earning couples share home production, agents receive additional
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surplus for being both high-earning and productive in the home. Thus, individuals with high home
productivity are more likely to enter occupation Hi.
The model in which agents are drawn from a continuum of both schooling costs and home
productivities is substantially more complicated to solve. The two-type model presented in this
section captures the main intuitions with respect to marriage patterns and investment incentives of
the multi-dimensional model. It is also straightforward to allow for men who are more productive
than women in the home (α′ > 1).
1.7 Limitations of the Model
Two extensions of the current model would be valuable to explore in future work. The ﬁrst is to
explicitly model ﬁrms and allow wages and the costs of amenities to be endogenous outcomes of
ﬁrm and home production technology. Such a model would be in line with existing literature on
occupational amenities (see e.g. Goldin and Katz, 2011; Rosen, 1986) and would provide general
equilibrium predictions of the impact of family-friendly policy on both ﬁrms and workers.
A second extension is to allow investment in both home productivity and schooling in the ﬁrst
period. As women's wages increase, men who are highly productive in the home would thus arise
endogenously. This would be complementary to existing work endogenizing men's participation
in home production as a function of women's labor market conditions (e.g. Fernández et al.,
2004; Feyrer et al., 2008).
1.8 Implications and Empirical Evidence
In this section, I present time trends for career, family, and marriage market outcomes for pro-
fessional women in a variety of occupation groups from the U.S. Census and the American
Community Survey. Cross-sectional variation in these outcomes broadly supports the predictions
of my model. While not a causal test of the mechanisms I investigate, it suggests the scope for
additional empirical work on their relative importance.
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In the data, I focus on two main predictions from Theorem 5. Let a dual-career couple be a
woman who achieves career and a high-earning or equally-educated husband. The ﬁrst prediction
is that dual-career couples in which the woman has an occupation with costly ﬂexibility are less
likely to have children than dual-career couples in which ﬂexibility in the woman's occupation
is less expensive. The second, related prediction is that women in occupations with high career
costs of family who achieve career and family are less likely to be part of a dual-career couple
than women in occupations with low career costs of family who achieve career and family.
Estimates from the literature allow me to rank the relative career cost of family for three
groups of high-earning occupations. Goldin and Katz (2011) estimate the earnings penalty for
spells of non-work for professionals using detailed survey data from Harvard College alumni. They
ﬁnd that individuals with an MD experienced the smallest log earnings penalty for a spell of non-
work of given length and MBAs the largest, with individuals with JDs in between.22 The data
were collected in 2006 from select classes graduating between 1969 and 1992. Thus, they can be
considered to provide estimates of the family-friendliness of these occupation groups up to the
2000 census.23
1.8.1 Data Description
I focus on individuals with post-graduate degrees in three groups of occupations - law, business,
and medicine - from the 1980 through 2000 United States Census and the 2010 American Com-
munity Survey. These groups are chosen to most closely correspond to the occupation groups
for which there are estimates of the cost of ﬂexibility (Goldin and Katz, 2011). I deﬁne law as
reporting an occupation of lawyer or judge, medicine as an occupation of physician, optometrist,
22Goldin and Katz (2011) ﬁnd that MDs experienced an earnings penalty of 17.3 log points for a job interruption
of 0.1 of years since the bachelor's degree, JDs a penalty of 34.5 log points, and MBAs a penalty of 53.1 log
points.
23The select sample used in this study may overstate the career cost of family compared to the population in
the Census. However, I only use the relative ranking of the occupations in further discussion.
36
podiatrist, or dentist, and business as the managerial and professional specialty occupations.24
I also include as a comparison group all individuals who have a post-graduate degree but are not
in these three categories.25
I limit my sample to women between the age of forty and ﬁfty, as women in this age range have
most likely completed their child-bearing. A woman has family if she reports having at least one
of her own children in her home.26 A woman has career if she reports wage and business income
equal to at least the twenty-ﬁfth percentile of men working full-time full-year in her profession and
in her age group.27 This is similar to the deﬁnition used by Goldin (2006) when analyzing career
and family for college graduates. Dual-career couples can either be deﬁned by the husband's
education or earnings. In the results reported here, a woman has an equally-educated spouse if
her husband reports also having a graduate degree. Substantively similar results are obtained if
husbands are categorized by earnings.28 Thus, a dual-career couple consists of a woman with
career and her equally-educated spouse.
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 and Figure 1.10 provide basic summary statistics and time trends in
marriage market outcomes, career, and family for women in business, medicine, and law. All
three sets of occupations show a substantial increase in the fraction of women over the course
of the sample, with women constituting about a third of each occupation group in 2010. The
earnings cutoﬀs for career have remained constant within occupation, with doctors having a
24About 70% of individuals classiﬁed as medicine are physicians. I exclude from the business category
legislators, funeral directors, and postmasters and include accountants and auditors, insurance underwriters, other
ﬁnancial specialists, and management analysts. Results are robust to changes in the deﬁnition of this group.
25Because type of graduate degree is not speciﬁed, I am not able to distinguish individuals who once worked
in these professions and switched to other occupations or who have been out of the labor force for ﬁve or more
years. Thus, this residual group may include doctors, lawyers, and businesswomen who no longer practice in their
ﬁelds.
26One potential concern with the selection of this age range is that children may be grown; the time trends
documented also hold for women between ages thirty-ﬁve and forty-ﬁve.
27Full-time full-year is deﬁned to be forty or more weeks per year and thirty-ﬁve or more hours per week.
28The deﬁnition of high earning can be with respect to absolute earnings (e.g. if his wage and business income
is at least the median of men working full-time, full-year in her occupation and his age group) or with respect to
her earnings (e.g. the husband earning some fraction more than his wife).
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for Professional Women, Ages 40-50, 1980-2010
Occupation Group 1980 1990 2000 2010
Post-BA n.e.c.
Career $57,093 $56,297 $52,360 $55,707
Num. Obs. 14,968 54,777 73,963 51,060
Frac. female 0.31 0.45 0.51 0.54
Business
Career $75,344 $79,168 $78,540 $88,118
Num. Obs. 1,165 5,346 10,056 9,283
Frac. female 0.11 0.20 0.30 0.33
Law
Career $89,058 $89,724 $83,776 $91,157
Num. Obs. 191 1,589 3,683 2,746
Frac. female 0.05 0.15 0.28 0.34
Medicine
Career $129,193 $133,706 $128,282 $140,010
Num. Obs. 408 1,326 3,162 2,690
Frac. female 0.06 0.13 0.23 0.32
Source: 1980 - 2000 U.S. Census of Population 5% sample; 2010 American Community Survey 1% sample. The
census data are produced and distributed by the IPUMS. Sample is all individuals with a post-college degree.
Medicine includes all individuals who report an occupation of physician, dentist, ophthalmologist, or podiatrist.
Law includes all individuals who report an occupation of lawyer of judge. Business includes all individuals who
report a managerial or professional specialty occupation, excluding funeral directors, litigators, and postmasters,
and including accountants and auditors, insurance underwriters, other ﬁnancial specialists, and management
analysts. Post-BA n.e.c. includes all individuals with a post-graduate degree not included in law, business, or
medicine. Career is the 25th percentile business and wage income for men working full-time (35+ hours per week)
and full-year (40+ weeks per year) in that profession group and age range in 2010 dollars.
threshold for career about forty percent higher than lawyers or businesswomen. Women in all
three professions are substantially more likely to be married in 2010 than in 1980.29 Doctors are
consistently more likely than lawyers and businesswomen to be married and to have children.
1.8.2 Patterns in Career, Family, and Marriage Market Outcomes
The time trends for the percentage of professional women achieving career, family and equally-
educated spouse reﬂect the increased entry and success of women in high-earning professional
29Married is deﬁned to be married, spouse present. The fraction of professional women ever married (married,
divorced, windowed, or separated) has remained between eighty and ninety percent for each occupation over the
sample.
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Table 1.3: Fraction Professional Women Obtaining Career, Family, and Marriage Market Outcomes,
Ages 40-50, 1980-2010
Business Law
1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010
Married Women
Career, Family, and Graduate Spouse 0.05 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.25 0.24
Career and Graduate Spouse 0.10 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.25 0.29 0.30 0.28
Family and Graduate Spouse 0.53 0.41 0.37 0.38 0.57 0.53 0.51 0.51
Graduate Spouse 0.68 0.56 0.47 0.45 0.70 0.68 0.61 0.57
Career and Family 0.09 0.21 0.32 0.34 0.24 0.28 0.38 0.41
Career 0.16 0.33 0.45 0.43 0.33 0.41 0.48 0.49
Family 0.75 0.70 0.75 0.81 0.83 0.74 0.80 0.87
Family Given Career and Graduate Spouse 0.55 0.68 0.75 0.83 0.73 0.70 0.82 0.87
Graduate Spouse Given Family and Career 0.62 0.63 0.50 0.48 0.76 0.72 0.65 0.58
Career Given Family and Graduate Spouse 0.10 0.32 0.43 0.44 0.32 0.39 0.48 0.47
All Women
Career and Family 0.06 0.16 0.23 0.26 0.16 0.20 0.29 0.32
Career 0.19 0.35 0.46 0.43 0.27 0.39 0.49 0.49
Family 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.62 0.61 0.55 0.61 0.67
Married 0.44 0.57 0.57 0.60 0.46 0.56 0.60 0.61
Medicine Post-BA n.e.c.
1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010
Married Women
Career, Family, and Graduate Spouse 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.12
Career and Graduate Spouse 0.28 0.33 0.29 0.29 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.14
Family and Graduate Spouse 0.78 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.53 0.40 0.36 0.37
Graduate Spouse 0.86 0.75 0.69 0.68 0.63 0.49 0.43 0.42
Career and Family 0.28 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.15 0.23 0.29 0.30
Career 0.34 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.21 0.31 0.38 0.36
Family 0.87 0.83 0.87 0.89 0.81 0.79 0.80 0.85
Family Given Career and Graduate Spouse 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.75 0.73 0.78 0.84
Graduate Spouse Given Family and Career 0.89 0.81 0.70 0.66 0.64 0.51 0.42 0.40
Career Given Family and Graduate Spouse 0.32 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.18 0.29 0.34 0.32
All Women
Career and Family 0.23 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.12 0.19 0.24 0.25
Career 0.36 0.41 0.43 0.45 0.27 0.36 0.42 0.40
Family 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.75 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.69
Married 0.64 0.68 0.68 0.71 0.57 0.64 0.63 0.66
For source, sample, and occupation group deﬁnitions, see Table 1.2. Family indicates having one or more children
in the home. Career is business and wage income equal to at least the 25th percentile of men in the same age
group working full time full year in that profession. Graduate spouse is a husband with a post-graduate degree.
Married is married, spouse present.
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ﬁelds. Married women in business and law are more likely to achieve career, family, and spouse in
2010 than they were in 1980 (Figure 1.10, Panel 1). In the year 2000, thirty percent of married
women in law and medicine achieved all three, with business substantially lower at ﬁfteen percent.
A key driver of this trend is an apparent increase in the labor market opportunities of women
with children: the probability women have achieved career and family has increased substantially
for all three occupations (Figure 1.10, Panel 1).
Panel 4 of Figure 1.10 provides preliminary evidence on one of the main predictions of the
model. The probability that a dual-career couple has at least one child varies accross occupations
in an ordering consistent with the empirical estimates of ﬂexibility. Throughout the sample
period, about ninety percent of dual-career couples including women doctors had at least one
child. Dual-career couples including women in law and business were ten to ﬁfteen percentage
points less likely to have any children than women in medicine in dual-career couples in 2000;
this is a substantial improvement over 1980 when about ﬁfty-ﬁve percent of business dual-career
couples and seventy-ﬁve percent of law dual career couples had any children.30
Mitigating the growth of career and family in achieving the triad of career, family and equally-
educated spouse, however, is a substantial decrease in the probability that the husband of a
professional woman who achieves career and family also has a graduate degree (Figure 1.10,
Panel 3). This decline is uniform for all four groups of professional women. This increase in
women marrying down has many potential explanations, including the increasing number of
educated women or later ages of marriage (Smits et al., 1999). The cross-sectional variation in
these marriage patterns, however, is again consistent with the estimates of ﬂexibility: married
women doctors are the most likely to have a graduate spouse and businesswomen are the least,
with law in between. Because all three groups have post-graduate degrees, variation in time spent
in school is unlikely to explain diﬀerences in these marriage patterns, although the nature of the
workplace remains a potential confound.
30It appears women in business have their children slightly earlier; using the 35-45 age range increases the
fertility of dual-career couples where the woman is in business by about ten percentage points. The ordering of
professions remains unchanged.
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One possible explanation for these cross-occupational patterns is simply income: the income
cutoﬀ for career is higher for medicine than for law or business, and this extra income may be used
to reduce the career cost of family in dimensions outside the scope of my model. Income, however,
does not seem to explain the entirety of the variation in Figure 1.10. While the career cutoﬀ for
women in business and law has been approximately equal throughout the sample, women in law
have patterns of career, family, and marriage that are closer to doctors than to businesswomen.
Women in law are substantially more likely than businesswomen to have an equally-educated
spouse conditional on having career and family. Controlling for income in a linear regression
model (not reported) does not eliminate this statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence. Lawyers have also
substantially outpaced businesswomen and even surpassed women doctors in the probability of
obtaining career and family.
My model provides two potential explanations for the time trends observed in the data. The
ﬁrst is that the increased earning potential of women, combined with changes in social norms and
home production technology, have increased the child care participation of professional women's
husbands. As discussed in the introduction, this trend has been established for college-educated
men in time use data (Aguiar and Hurst, 2007; Guryan et al., 2008). More productive men in the
home would result in both more dual career couples with children (if couples share home produc-
tion) and more professional women marrying lower-earning men (who provide home production).
Another potential explanation is that these occupations have experienced a decreased cost of
ﬂexibility over time. This seems particularly plausible for the patterns observed in law, in which
women now achieve career, family, and spouse at the same rate as medicine, despite earning far
less.
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper I have presented an integrated model of occupation choice, spouse choice, labor
supply, and fertility. I unify an extensive literature on career and family and provide new testable
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predictions on the relationships among career, family, and marriage market outcomes. When
occupations exhibit high costs of an amenity ﬂexibility that impacts the opportunity cost of child
care, the equilibrium adjusts on three margins. Fewer women enter these occupations; individu-
als in these occupations are less likely to marry one another; and high-earning couples in these
occupations are less likely to have children. Decreasing the cost of ﬂexibility may simultaneously
increase the fraction of women in a high-earning occupation while decreasing their labor supply,
as both fertility and positive sorting in the marriage market become more attractive. Introducing
occupational amenities changes the incentives for men and women to specialize in home produc-
tion or market work: when ﬂexibility is costly, the marriage market may reward men and women
who are both high-earning and productive in the home. Empirical trends from the Census and
the American Community Survey support the predictions of my model.
Reducing this set of complex life choices to the primitives of home production technology and
labor market parameters raises fundamental questions about the nature of childcare and of work.
Decreasing the cost of ﬂexibility or reducing minimum labor supply requirements can help women
to achieve career and family. However, there are occupations - for example as a senior oﬃcial in
the Department of State or the CEO of a major corporation - for which such adjustment may
not be possible. The very nature of the work prevents its occupant from engaging in non-trivial
amounts of home production. For women achieve career and family in such positions may thus
require adjustment of the dynamics of and preferences in the marriage market.
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Chapter 2
Spouse Choice and Female Labor
Supply: Evidence from Lawyers
2.1 Introduction
The literature on the relationship between marriage market outcomes and the occupation choices,
educational investments, and labor supply of women has seen a recent resurgence. In parallel with
recent media and academic attention on the lack of women in high-powered professional roles
(see e.g. Bertrand and Hallock (2001)), a growing literature has investigated the relationship
between the nature of work in diﬀerent occupations and tradeoﬀs between marriage, career, and
family (Bertrand et al., 2010; Goldin and Katz, 2011, 2012). This literature has advanced the
importance of occupational amenities as well as wages in the choice of occupation for mothers
and the career cost of having a family. It builds on a literature documenting the willingness of
women to purchase ﬂexibility in work hours (Altonji and Paxson, 1992) as well as incorporating
the importance of household bargaining in determining female labor supply (Chiappori, 1992;
Chiappori et al., 2002; Blundell et al., 2005, 2007).
In this paper I empirically investigate the relationship between spouse choice and the family
and labor supply decisions of highly-educated professional women. Previous work has shown that
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that highly-educated professionals have a propensity to marry others in the same profession due
to both preferences for similar mates and search frictions (Kalmijn, 1994; Lee, 2011). With time
demands at work increasing among highly-educated salaried workers (Kuhn and Lozano, 2008),
dual-career professional couples with children may face increasing time conﬂicts at home from
competing job demands. This acute career and family conﬂict is one of many hypotheses for
why professional organizations have struggled to retain qualiﬁed women in mid- and upper-level
positions, despite their growing presence in the lower ranks (Harvard, 2005; Catalyst, 2010).
Recent research has begun to investigate the importance of spouse characteristics for the labor
supply decisions of professional mothers: MBAs with children and high-earning husbands are more
likely to reduce their weekly hours and take career breaks, thus incurring steep career penalties
(Bertrand et al., 2010).
I build on this line of work by examining the implications of sorting in the marriage market
for the labor supply and fertility decisions for high-powered professional women. If higher-ability
women are more likely to marry higher-earning men even within the population of elite profession-
als, then the time challenges of dual-career couples with children will fall most acutely on those
women with the highest potential to rise to the top of their ﬁelds. Having high-earning husbands
also gives these women the unique freedom to take breaks from work, exchanging income for
more time with family at critical stages of childhood. Thus, assortative mating may have real
implications for which set of professional women opt in and out of the labor force and the fraction
of women in top professional positions.
I investigate these dynamics using the University of Michigan Law School Alumni Survey, a
longitudinal administrative survey with detailed information on school performance, work history,
children and childcare, spouse characteristics, and family and career satisfaction. The portion of
the survey I use spans almost 20 years, administered from 1987 to 2006, and covers 30 years of
law school graduates. Attendees of this law school are an accomplished group, with 12% coming
from Ivy League or Seven Sisters colleges and a median LSAT national percentile of 95. This
group provides an excellent case study of the labor supply patterns above: over the course of the
45
survey period the fraction of women in the law school class grew from 5% in 1970 to 46% in 2000
(Figure 2.1) while the fraction of women working full-time 15 years after law school graduation
dropped from 86% in the class of 1970 to 63% in the class of 1990 (Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.1: The fraction of each graduating class who are female. Sample includes all students who
graduated before age 31 and in less than six years. See Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions.
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Figure 2.2: Labor supply outcomes 15 years after graduation by graduation year, gender, and whether
respondent has children. Sample includes all survey respondents who graduated before age 31 and in
less than six years. See Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions.
I ﬁrst provide a decomposition of the gender earnings gap for lawyers, updating the study
of Wood et al. (1993). At ﬁve and 15 years after graduation, female survey respondents have
earnings that are 11 and 53 log points lower, respectively, than their male counterparts. Using
the ﬁrst three years of survey data taken 15 years after graduation, Wood et al. (1993) ﬁnd that
controlling for demographics, performance, labor force participation, and job characteristics still
leaves one-fourth to one-third of the gender gap in earnings unexplained. I ﬁnd that at ﬁve years
after graduation, the entire gender gap in earnings can be explained by gender diﬀerences in law
school performance and current and prior labor supply. At 15 years, controlling for workplace
setting as well renders the unexplained earnings diﬀerential between men and women statistically
insigniﬁcant. A key component of the gender gap in earnings in the 15-year survey seems to be
that men lawyers are more likely to enter highly lucrative non-law jobs in business and ﬁnance.
These ﬁndings echo the results of Bertrand et al. (2010), who ﬁnd that diﬀerences in human
capital investments and past and current labor supply can explain 83% of the gender gap in
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earnings among MBAs 12 years after graduation from business school.
I then assess changes in the career cost of family across time at ﬁve and 15 years after
graduation. I ﬁnd evidence of an increase in linearity in the career cost of family with respect
to time out of the labor force 15 years after graduation. While women graduating in the ﬁrst half
of the sample experience a large, discrete earnings penalty for having spent six or more months
out of the labor force, women in the second half of the sample experience an earnings penalty
proportional to the number of months spent not working. This results in a lower earnings penalty
for graduates with spells of non-work less than two years long. While the workplace settings of
workers with prior spells of non-work have not changed over the 20 years of the survey, there is
some evidence that large law ﬁrms and corporate settings are increasingly allowing reductions in
labor supply in the form of part-time work. The relationship between changes in job design in
corporate law settings in the decrease in the career cost of family is a topic that deserves futher
exploration.
In the second section of the paper, I address the relationship between positive assortative
mating on earnings and the labor supply and fertility decisions of high-ability female lawyers.
Because the gender gap in earnings can largely be explained by observables, I can predict the
earnings potential of the women had they pursued careers like men, without reductions in labor
supply for spouse and family. I ﬁnd that women with higher earnings potential are more likely to
be married ﬁve years after graduation, and by 15 years after graduation, there is a strong positive
correlation between a woman's earnings potential and the earnings of her husband. Moreover,
spousal earnings have ﬁrst-order eﬀects on women's fertility and labor supply: mothers with
high-earning husbands are less likely to be in the labor force and work fewer hours conditional
on working than mothers with lower-earning husbands. They also have more children, which is
correlated with reduced labor supply. Thus, the women with the highest earnings potential are
those who are most likely to be opting out due to the pressures of career and family. Moreover,
these correlations only hold for the second half of the sample, when the earnings penalty for
modest spells of non-work decreased. I therefore argue that the decrease in the earnings penalty
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for spells of non-work resulted in a decrease in labor supply for women with the highest earnings
potential, as these women have the spousal resources to take advantage of the reduced cost of
this amenity.
The empirical results here can best be understood in the frameworks of Becker (1973) and in
Chapter 1. Becker ﬁrst observed that negative assortative mating on labor market skill is socially
eﬃcient with respect to maximizing the labor force participation of the highest-ability individuals,
especially if there are increasing returns to scale for labor market or home work. Here, as in his
treatise, positive assortative mating is instead pervasive. The framework in Chapter 1 provides
an explanation: if child care cannot be eﬃciently shifted from wives to husbands, then positive
assortative mating on earnings potential is the unique marriage market equilibrium. Moreover, if
women have an advantage in child care, a decrease in the discrete earnings penalty from reduced
labor supply will result in high-earning couples shifting childcare from the husband to the wife
and a reduction in the wife's labor supply. This decrease in constraints, however, makes entering
a high-earning occupation (or a high-earning track within an occupation) more attractive for
women, as it allows them to have it all: a high-earning spouse, family, and stimulating work
with ﬂexibility in labor supply.
2.2 The Data
The University of Michigan Law School (UMLS) Alumni Survey is an annual several-hundred ques-
tion survey administered by the law school for administrative purposes. Graduates are contacted
5, 15, 25, 35, and 45 years after graduation and asked detailed questions about work history,
family, current jobs, time use, and career and life satisfaction. These responses are matched
to administrative data that includes application information, law school performance, and de-
mographics. The survey has been administered every year from 1967 through 2006. I restrict
the data to survey years in which questions on spouse income and occupation, own labor supply
history, and undergraduate performance were asked (5-year: 1982-2000; 15-year:1972-1991).
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UMLS is consistently ranked among the top 14 law schools in the country. For the years
for which there is 15-year survey data, UMLS was particularly prestigious: US News and World
Report's inaugural ranking of law schools in 1987 ranked UMLS third in the country, behind only
Yale and Harvard (Lomio et al., 2008). Throughout our sample period, the median student had
an LSAT score at least at the 90th percentile among all LSAT takers nationally (Figure 2.3).
About 12% of students attended Ivy League or Seven Sisters schools as undergraduates (Table
2.1).
Figure 2.3: LSAT national percentile distribution by gender and graduation year. Sample includes all
students who graduated before age 31 and in less than six years. See Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions.
The demographics of the student body have evolved in line with broader changes in profes-
sional school attendance. From 1970 to 2000 the fraction of women has increased from just
under 10% to approximately 40% (Figure 2.1). This is similar to the trends documented for a
broader sample of lawyers by Goldin and Katz (2011). The student body is also more racially
diverse: the fraction African American graduates increased in the 1970's and remained at slightly
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below 10% throughout the sample, and the fractions Hispanic and Asian students have steadily
increased over the last three decades (Table 2.1). Mean age at graduation for both men and
women has remained constant at about 26 years old (Table 2.1). The substantial year-to-year
ﬂuctuation in mean age of graduation may reﬂect changes in economic conditions and outside
employment opportunities (Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4: Mean age at graduation by gender. Sample includes all students who graduated before age
31 and in less than six years. See Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions.
I exclude from the subsequent analysis individuals who graduated after age 30. While an
interesting sub-group, these individuals face diﬀerent career and family tradeoﬀs than those who
graduate during the typical ages of 25-27. Speciﬁcally, they are more likely to have resolved
career and family negotiations before deciding to attend law school. This eliminates about 10%
of the sample. In addition, I exclude anyone who took more than ﬁve years to ﬁnish law school
(<1% of respondents). This leaves a sample of 4,125 respondents to the ﬁfth-year survey and
4,233 for the 15th.
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2.3 Survey Non-Response
Average response rates for the survey are high (5-year: 68%; 15-year: 67%) but have declined
steadily over time (Figure 2.5). T-tests for diﬀerences in means (not reported) show that non-
respondents had systematically worse law school performance than respondents. To control for
this non-randomness in survey response, I model the response probability using a probit model
with covariates drawn from performance measures and demographics from UMLS's administrative
records. The probability that person i with observables Xi responds to the survey is
ri = Φ(X′iβ)
where Xi includes gender and race; undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and institu-
tion type; law school GPA, LSAT national percentile, and whether a transfer; and dummies for
graduation year in ﬁve-year groups.
Figure 2.5: Probability of survey response by graduation year. Sample includes all students who
graduated before age 31 and in less than six years. See Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions.
The regression results conﬁrm that individuals with better law school performance are more
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likely to respond to the survey (Table 2.2). Law school GPA has a positive and highly signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the probability of response. Women are more likely than men to answer the 5-year
survey. Undergraduate institution and other performance measures have no predictive power,
except that Ivy League / Seven Sisters graduates are less likely to respond (not reported). The
predicted probabilities of response rˆi are bounded away from zero with a smooth, single-peaked
distribution (see Figure 2.6).
Figure 2.6: Estimated probability of survey response using administrative data. Estimates calculated
using regressions 1 (5th year) and 4 (15th year) from Table 2.2 for all students graduating before age 31
and in less than six years.
I weight each observation by the inverse of the estimated probability of non-response rˆi from
the pooled regressions (Table 2.2, Columns 1 and 4). This is a standard method in the survey data
54
T
a
b
le
2
.2
:
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
of
S
u
rv
ey
R
es
p
on
se
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
5t
h
Y
ea
r
5t
h
Y
ea
r,
W
om
en
5t
h
Y
ea
r,
M
en
15
th
Y
ea
r
15
th
Y
ea
r,
W
om
en
15
th
Y
ea
r,
M
en
F
em
al
e
0.
11
**
*
0.
04
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
4)
L
aw
S
ch
o
ol
G
P
A
0.
14
**
*
0.
14
**
*
0.
14
**
*
0.
15
**
*
0.
18
**
*
0.
14
**
*
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
4)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
4)
(0
.0
2)
L
S
A
T
P
er
ce
n
ti
le
0.
00
**
0.
01
0.
00
0.
00
0.
01
**
-0
.0
0
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
0)
T
ra
n
sf
er
-0
.1
1
-0
.0
9
-0
.1
4
-0
.0
5
0.
04
-0
.0
9
S
tu
d
en
t
(0
.0
9)
(0
.1
5)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.0
9)
(0
.1
7)
(0
.1
1)
U
n
d
er
gr
ad
u
at
e
-0
.0
1
0.
01
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
3
0.
01
-0
.0
4*
G
P
A
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
4)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
4)
(0
.0
2)
C
on
st
an
t
-2
.5
7
-7
.0
2
0.
55
-1
.3
0
3.
68
-2
.8
8
(4
.3
5)
(6
.7
1)
(5
.7
6)
(3
.9
1)
(7
.3
7)
(4
.6
5)
A
ge
,
A
ge
S
q
u
ar
ed
.
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
ac
e
D
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
U
n
d
er
gr
ad
u
at
e
S
ch
o
ol
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
oh
or
t
D
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
63
80
23
39
40
41
68
21
17
10
51
10
P
se
u
d
o
R
2
0.
02
5
0.
03
3
0.
02
2
0.
02
2
0.
03
3
0.
02
3
P
ro
b
it
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
w
it
h
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
eq
u
al
to
1
if
g
ra
d
u
at
e
re
sp
o
n
d
ed
to
su
rv
ey
.
S
ig
n
iﬁ
ca
n
t
at
:
*
1
0
%
;
*
*
5
%
;
*
*
*
1
%
.
S
am
p
le
in
cl
u
d
es
al
l
st
u
d
en
ts
in
th
e
cl
as
se
s
o
f
1
9
8
2
-2
0
0
0
(5
th
ye
ar
)
an
d
1
9
7
2
-1
9
9
1
(1
5
th
ye
ar
)
w
h
o
g
ra
d
u
at
ed
b
ef
or
e
ag
e
3
1
an
d
in
le
ss
th
an
si
x
ye
ar
s.
D
u
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
fo
r
m
is
si
n
g
va
lu
es
o
f
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
s
in
cl
u
d
ed
b
u
t
n
o
t
re
p
or
te
d
.
S
ee
A
p
p
en
d
ix
B
fo
r
va
ri
ab
le
d
eﬁ
n
it
io
n
s.
55
literature for reducing the bias from non-random survey non-response (see e.g. Little (1986)). I
opt for reweighting rather than a control function approach because the administrative variables
do not contain an observable that can be used as an instrument for response. The regression
results I report in the rest of the paper do not correct for the uncertainty from estimating the
response weights.
2.4 The Gender Earnings Gap
Since the work of Wood et al. (1993), another 15 years of survey data from the UMLS has been
collected. The larger panel allows me to measure how the career cost of family has changed over
time as well as how it diﬀers across diﬀerent law and non-law-practice settings.
2.4.1 Patterns in Earnings, Hours, and Labor Supply Over Time
Table 2.3 provides summary statistics for earnings and labor supply for individuals who are in the
work force at the time of the survey. Michigan graduates are generally a high-paid group: the
median ﬁrst year graduate's earnings have grown from about $69,000 in the 1970's to $88,000
in the 1990's, and at 15 years after gaduation the median man earned from between $189,000
in the 1970's to $234,000 in the 1990's. Mean and median weekly hours for men have remained
relatively steady over the sample. The average woman reports spending over a year working
part-time and over a year not working, while men report almost no labor supply reductions (Table
2.4)
Two patterns are worth noting in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The ﬁrst is the growth in earnings
inequality even among this group of highly-educated lawyers. The standard deviation of earnings
for men 15 years after graduation has almost quadrupled over the three decades of the survey,
from $174,000 to $731,000. A more modest increase is evident in the ﬁve year surveys. The
second pattern of interest is the systematic decrease in labor supply for female graduates 15 years
after graduation over these three decades. Between the ﬁrst and second decade of the sample,
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the median hours, median earnings, and average time in the labor force for women graduates
decreased. The median woman in the work force 15 years after graduation works ten hours less
than the median man in the most recent set of 15-year surveys.
2.4.2 Deﬁning Labor Supply and Workplace Setting
Survey respondents provide both the hours per week and weeks per year worked in the previous
year. In addition, they report the number of years since graduation spent working part-time, years
spent out of the labor force, and years spent practicing law. I deﬁne an individual to have positive
current labor supply if he or she reports working more than zero hours per week and more than
zero weeks per year. If both of these variables are missing, an individual is not currently working
if he or she reports being not employed at the current time. I decompose past labor supply in to
two parts: indicators for whether the individual reports ever working part time or ever being out
of the labor force for more than six months, and linear terms for years spent working part time,
years spent out of the labor force, and years spent practicing law. This decomposition allows me
to measure both the linear and discrete cost of time oﬀ as in Goldin and Katz (2011).
A respondent's current job is categorized by function and setting. Following the coding of
the UMLS survey team, I summarize each workplace as one of law ﬁrm, corporate counsel,
government / legal services / public interest, or not practicing. Non-practice settings include
teaching, business, and the judiciary. Attorneys in law ﬁrms are classiﬁed as solo practicioners,
partners, associates, or other (including of counsel).
Among individuals whom I classify as in the labor force, 96% have current earnings data in
the 5 year survey and 92% in the 15-year. There is no evidence that the observations missing
earnings are systematically diﬀerent than those with responses, so I consider these observations
to be missing at random. Observations with missing job description or labor supply variables are
coded with a dummy and included in the sample.
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2.4.3 Gender Earnings Gap Across Career Stages and Workplace
Settings
Following the literature, I estimate a series of earnings equations that measure the diﬀerence in
mean earnings between men and women conditional on observables. The coeﬃcient on female
measures the diﬀerence in mean earnings between men and women that cannot be explained by
the observables included in the regression. The regressions have the form
yi = β0 + β1 · f emalei + β2 · Xi + djdyr + ei
where yi is log earnings from employment in the year of the survey, Xi are individual charac-
teristics, djdyr are graduation-year dummies, and ei is an iid error. For each of the ﬁfth year
and 15th year survey, I allow Xi to include baseline controls (law school and undergraduate
performance, demographics, and current location), current labor supply, past labor supply, and
workplace characteristics.
A ﬁrst-order concern is that an analysis of working individuals will fail to reveal discrimination
if women who believe their future earnings are low due in part to discrimination opt out of the
labor force. Patterns of fertility and marriage indicate that women with reduced labor supply are
mothers with relatively high law school performance and high-earning spouses. I model selection
in to the labor force in the next section.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present, respectively, earnings regressions for respondents ﬁve and 15 years
after graduation. Among lawyers with positive labor supply, and without including any controls,
women report earnings that are 11 log points lower than their male counterparts ﬁve years after
graduation (signiﬁcant at 1%) and a staggering 54 log points 15 years after graduation (also
signiﬁcant at 1%).
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Table 2.5: Gender Gap in Earnings Among the Employed, 5th Year Survey
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.05*** -0.01 -0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Law School GPA 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
LSAT Percentile -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Undergraduate -0.02** -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02*
GPA (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log Hrs/Week 0.50** 0.46*** 0.42** 0.40**
(0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Log Hrs/Week x 0.07* 0.00 0.01 0.01
35-50 Hrs/Wk (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Log Hrs/Week x 0.07* -0.00 0.01 0.01
50-65 Hrs/Wk (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Log Hrs/Week x 0.05 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
>65 Hrs/Wk (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Log Weeks/Yr 0.49*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.32***
(0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Ever Part-Time -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ever Not Emp. -0.08** -0.10** -0.09**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Years Part-Time -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.20***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Years Not Emp. -0.21** -0.22** -0.22***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Years Prac. Law 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 11.57*** 12.98*** 12.66*** 8.48*** 8.04*** 7.28*** 6.87**
(0.04) (2.34) (2.34) (2.04) (1.71) (2.10) (2.17)
Age, Age Squared No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Undergraduate School No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workplace Setting No No No No No Yes Yes
Non-Practice Setting No No No No No No Yes
Observations 3702 3702 3702 3702 3702 3702 3702
R2 0.052 0.184 0.235 0.348 0.465 0.491 0.508
Outcome is log annual earnings in 2007 dollars. Signiﬁcant at: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Sample includes all
survey respondents from the classes of 1982-2000 currently in the labor force who graduated before age 31 and
in less than six years. See Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions. Dummy variables for missing values and whether
transfer student included but not reported. All regressions include year of graduation ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors
clustered by census region included in parentheses.
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Table 2.6: Gender Gap in Earnings Among the Employed, 15th Year Survey
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female -0.54*** -0.51*** -0.50*** -0.21*** -0.07** -0.07*** -0.06**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Law School GPA 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
LSAT Percentile -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Undergraduate -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
GPA (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log Hrs/Week 0.97*** 1.00*** 0.99*** 0.96***
(0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Log Hrs/Week x 0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04
35-50 Hrs/Wk (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Log Hrs/Week x 0.08* -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
50-65 Hrs/Wk (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Log Hrs/Week x 0.02 -0.09** -0.09** -0.08**
>65 Hrs/Wk (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Log Weeks/Yr 0.57** 0.41* 0.43* 0.42*
(0.21) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Ever Part-Time -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.20***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Ever Not Emp. -0.09** -0.08* -0.07*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Years Part-Time -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Years Not Emp. -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.09***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Years Prac. Law 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 12.16*** 11.34* 13.00* 2.98 3.04 1.23 3.23
(0.04) (5.88) (5.86) (5.59) (4.42) (3.91) (3.87)
Age, Age Squared No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Undergraduate School No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workplace Setting No No No No No Yes Yes
Non-Practice Setting No No No No No No Yes
Observations 3631 3631 3631 3631 3631 3631 3631
R2 0.083 0.196 0.230 0.412 0.474 0.494 0.516
Outcome is log annual earnings in 2007 dollars. Signiﬁcant at: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Sample includes all
survey respondents from the classes of 1972-1991 currently in the labor force who graduated before age 31 and
in less than six years. See Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions. Dummy variables for missing values and whether
transfer student included but not reported. All regressions include year of graduation ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors
clustered by census region included in parentheses.
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In both the ﬁve and 15 year survey, the combination of current and past labor supply, aptitude
measures, and workplace setting can explain virtually all of the gender gap in earnings. When
all controls are included, the coeﬃcient on female at ﬁve years is actually positive, though not
diﬀerent from zero, while a statistically signiﬁcant earnings gap of 7.6 log points (14% of the raw
gap) remains in the 15th year. This residual gender gap for 15 years is strikingly close to that
found by Wood et al. (1993) even though they only consider three years of data.1
In Table 2.7 I investigate the unexplained portion of the 15-year earnings gap by estimating
earnings equations for each of the four workplace settings. For the three law practice settings
(law ﬁrms, corporate counsel, and government / legal services / public interest), the gender gap
in earnings is almost entirely eliminated when controls for school performance and labor supply
are included. The unexplained residual gap remains only for non-practicing lawyers. Replacing
controls for workplace setting with more detailed controls for organization type cuts the magnitude
of the gender earnings gap in half and it is no longer statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
(Column 5). The coeﬃcients on organization type (not reported) suggest that the residual
earnings diﬀerence is due to men lawyers having a higher propensity to take high-paying non-law
business and ﬁnance jobs.
1Wood et al. (1993) also include marital status and number of children as controls in their earnings regressions.
I instead include these as controls and only include work-related controls in my earnings equations. They also do
not decompose the earnings penalty from time oﬀ in to discrete and continuous parts.
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Table 2.7: Gender Gap in Earnings Among the Employed by Work Setting, 15th Year Survey
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Law Firm Corporate Govt/Pub Serv Non-Practicing Non-Practicing
Female -0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.14 -0.06
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08) (0.07)
Log Hrs/Week 1.06*** 1.09*** 0.17 0.92*** 0.82***
(0.15) (0.18) (0.37) (0.12) (0.12)
Log Hrs/Week x -0.00 -0.07 0.01 -0.08* -0.06
35-50 Hrs/Wk (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Log Hrs/Week x -0.00 -0.07 0.03 -0.02 -0.01
50-65 Hrs/Wk (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Log Hrs/Week x -0.06 -0.12 -0.03 -0.08 -0.05
>65 Hrs/Wk (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09)
Log Weeks/Yr -0.03 0.83*** 0.55 0.38 0.32
(0.14) (0.15) (0.37) (0.30) (0.24)
Ever Part-Time -0.16** -0.07 -0.12 -0.41*** -0.28**
(0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09)
Ever Not Emp. -0.17*** -0.24*** -0.04 -0.02 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.12) (0.10)
Years Part-Time -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Years Not Emp. -0.07*** 0.05 -0.01 -0.10** -0.10*
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Years Prac. Law 0.04*** 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 2.45 -2.11 -3.16 -15.37 0.84
(4.28) (9.68) (9.38) (10.32) (12.30)
Age, Age Squared Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Undergraduate Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Law School Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Organization Type No No No No Yes
Observations 2039 470 376 681 681
R2 0.485 0.401 0.440 0.496 0.565
Outcome is log annual earnings in 2007 dollars. Signiﬁcant at: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Sample includes all
survey respondents from the classes of 1972-1991 currently in the labor force who graduated before age 31 and
in less than six years. See Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions. Dummy variables for missing values and whether
transfer student included but not reported. All regressions include year of graduation ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors
clustered by census region included in parentheses.
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Following Wood et al. (1993) and Bertrand et al. (2010), I decompose the gender earnings
gap for each year in to its component parts in Table 2.8. The contribution of a set of variables to
explaining the gender earnings gap is measured as ∑v βv(X¯m − X¯ f ), where v index the variables
in that group (for example, demographics), βv is the coeﬃcient on each v from the preferred
regression, and ¯Xv,m − ¯Xv, f is the diﬀerence in means between men and women for variable v
in the data. For both survey years my preferred regression includes baseline performance and
current and past labor supply but not workplace characteristics (Regression 4 in Tables 2.5 and
2.6).
Past labor supply is by a huge margin the largest explanatory set of variable for the gender
gap in earnings in both the ﬁfth and 15th year surveys. Previous spells of part-time and non-
work explain 49% of the gender earnings gap ﬁve years after graduation and 43% 15 years after.
Current labor supply is the second-most important set of explanatory variables, and are far more
important at 15 years than at ﬁve (34% compared to 17%). Unsurprisingly, academic performance
is more important at ﬁve years (15%) than at 15, at which point it is almost irrelevant.
From the point of view of discrimination, this decomposition is encouraging and mirrors the
conclusions in Bertrand et al. (2010). For at least the ﬁrst ﬁve years of a career, earnings are
entirely a function of school performance and labor force participation. Controlling for job choice
- an outcome which may be an endogenous outcome of discrimination or family time constraints -
is not required to eliminate the gender earnings gap. 15 years after graduation, these same choice
variables can entirely account for earnings diﬀerences between men and women who practice law
and 86% of the gap overall, although selection in to workplace setting plays an important role,
in particular for non-practicing lawyers.
2.4.4 Linearity of the Gender Earnings Gap and Changes Over Time
An important component of the family-friendliness of a high-earning occupation is the discrete-
ness of the earnings penalty as a function of time away from work (Goldin and Katz, 2011).
Occupations that impose a large discrete penalty in earnings for any nontrivial reduction in la-
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bor supply are particularly family-unfriendly as workers may never recover from a short period
of absence. Moreover, this steep drop in earnings may discourage them from trying to do so.
The regressions in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 shed light on the (non-)linearity of the cost of time oﬀ
for three dimensions of reduced labor supply. For each survey wave I report a pooled regression
where labor supply terms are interacted with decade and separate regressions by decade.
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Table 2.9: Changes in Career Cost of Family Over Time, 5th Year Survey
(1) (2) (3)
All 1982-1990 1991-2000
Female 0.01 -0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Log Hrs/Week x -0.21
1991-2000 (0.26)
Ever Part-Time -0.01
x 1991-2000 (0.09)
Ever Not Emp. x 0.01
1991-2000 (0.04)
Years Part-Time 0.05
x 1991-2000 (0.05)
Years Not Emp. -0.05
x 1991-2000 (0.05)
Years Prac. Law 0.04***
x 1991-2000 (0.01)
Log Hrs/Week 0.47** 0.53** 0.26
(0.19) (0.19) (0.17)
Ever Part-Time -0.08 -0.08 -0.09***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.02)
Ever Not Emp. -0.06 -0.06 -0.06**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Years Part-Time -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.16***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Years Not Emp. -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.26***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
Years Prac. Law 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 6.84** 2.99 10.98***
(2.17) (3.04) (3.16)
Age, Age Squared Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes
Undergraduate Controls Yes Yes Yes
Law School Controls Yes Yes Yes
Workplace Setting Yes Yes Yes
Non-Practice Setting Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3702 1865 1837
R2 0.516 0.553 0.499
Outcome is log annual earnings in 2007 dollars. Signiﬁcant at: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Sample includes all survey
respondents from the classes of 1982-2000 currently in the labor force who graduated before age 31 and in less
than six years. See Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions. Dummy variables for missing values and whether transfer
student included but not reported. Controls for log weeks per year included but not reported. All regressions
include year of graduation ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors clustered by census region included in parentheses.
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Table 2.10: Changes in Career Cost of Family Over Time, 15th Year Survey
(1) (2) (3)
All 1972-1980 1981-1991
Female -0.06** -0.07 -0.05*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.02)
Log Hrs/Week x -0.07
1981-1991 (0.10)
Ever Part-Time 0.08
x 1981-1991 (0.06)
Ever Not Emp. x 0.16***
1981-1991 (0.04)
Years Part-Time -0.02
x 1981-1991 (0.02)
Years Not Emp. -0.09**
x 1981-1991 (0.03)
Years Prac. Law 0.00
x 1981-1991 (0.00)
Log Hrs/Week 1.02*** 1.07*** 0.93***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Ever Part-Time -0.24** -0.27*** -0.16***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
Ever Not Emp. -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.02
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Years Part-Time -0.03 -0.02 -0.05***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Years Not Emp. -0.02 -0.04 -0.11***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Years Prac. Law 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 2.37 4.73 -0.07
(3.99) (7.05) (9.67)
Age, Age Squared Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes
Undergraduate Controls Yes Yes Yes
Law School Controls Yes Yes Yes
Workplace Setting Yes Yes Yes
Non-Practice Setting Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3631 1848 1783
R2 0.520 0.498 0.549
Outcome is log annual earnings in 2007 dollars. Signiﬁcant at: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Sample includes all survey
respondents from the classes of 1972-1991 currently in the labor force who graduated before age 31 and in less
than six years. See Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions. Dummy variables for missing values and whether transfer
student included but not reported. Controls for log weeks per year included but not reported. All regressions
include year of graduation ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors clustered by census region included in parentheses.
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Hours worked per week is strongly correlated with earnings at all stages of the career. The
relationship between hours per week and earnings is concave at ﬁve years (β = 0.5 < 1) and
linear at 15 years.2 When controls for previous experience are included, the eﬀect of an increase
in hours per week on earnings does not generally depend on the number of hours, except for
extremely long work weeks at 15 years for which there is slight evidence of decreasing returns to
increased hours. The returns to longer hours do not diﬀer for full-time and part-time workers.
In the ﬁfth year surveys, the earnings penalty for part-time work and non-work is linear and
constant over the survey period. The coeﬃcient on having a spell of either non-work or part-time
work that is six months or longer is not statistically diﬀerent from zero, while each year of part-
time or non-work will cost a man or woman a whopping 21 to 23 log points of earnings. There
is substantial change in the structure of the earnings penalty for spells of non-work 15 years after
graduation. In the ﬁrst decade, any spell of non-work of six months or longer reduces earnings by
18 log points, with almost no linear penalty, while in the second decade of the survey the penalty
is 11 log points for each year of non-work with no discrete penalty. The cost of working part-time
appears to also become more linear, but the coeﬃcients on past labor supply variables are not
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across decades. In all cases, the type of work matters: each
year spent practicing law is correlated with higher earnings controlling for time spent working.
From the ﬁrst to second decade of the 15-year survey, the earnings penalty for taking between
six months and two years out of the labor force decreased. Unsurprisingly, this coincided with
an increase in the fraction of women reporting spells of non-work of six months or longer; in
the average years reported not working; and in the fraction of women and men reporting being
out of the labor force at the time of the survey (Table 2.4). In the next section, I explore the
relationship between family and marriage market outcomes and this decrease in labor supply.
2While current earnings and hours per week have a concave relationship, this certainly does not take in to
account the expected payoﬀ from making partner in the future.
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2.4.5 A Preliminary Explanation
Why might the discrete penalty for spells of non-work decreased over this time period? Some
evidence of increased labor supply ﬂexibility in law ﬁrms and corporate settings can be drawn
from the job titles and workplace settings of respondents who report working part-time at the
time of the survey (Table 2.11). In the 1972-1980 15-year cohort, part-time workers are largely
solo practitioners or in a non-practicing, other position. They are much less likely than full-
time workers to be partners at a ﬁrm with more than one lawyer or corporate counsel. In the
1981-1991 cohort, however, part-time workers have inﬁltrated a wider spectrum of law jobs. The
fraction in solo practice has decreased dramatically, far outstripping the decrease in the fraction
of full-time lawyers in solo practice. Part-time workers are almost as likely as full-time workers
to be corporate counsel. In multi-lawyer ﬁrms, one can see the creation of the role of part-time
partner as well as a slight increase in other, which includes of counsel and other more senior,
non-partner positions within ﬁrms.
Workers with prior spells of non-work now have jobs more similar to those with continuous
labor force participation in the second decade than they did in the ﬁrst (Table 2.12). Because
of the rise in the non-practice category for both workers with and without non-work spells, it
is diﬃcult to determine how this shift in workplace setting has aﬀected the penalty for non-work
calculated in the previous section.
2.5 Career, Family, and Labor Supply
The previous section established two facts. First, for those lawyers in the labor force, demo-
graphics, law school performance, work history, and job type are largely suﬃent for explaining
the gender gap in earnings. Second, there is some evidence that the earnings penalty for spells of
non-work has shifted from a discrete cost for any spell over six months to a linear cost proportional
to years not working over the course of the survey period.
In this section, I investigate to what extent marriage market patterns interact with fertility
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and labor supply decisions to explain the changes in labor supply discussed in the introduction.
Marriage market matching may be important in determining who is opting out of the labor
market and who chooses to stay in. The implications of the composition of this group are very
diﬀerent depending on who is opting out: if the highest-ability women are choosing not to work,
this margin may provide an explanation for the lack women partners at top law ﬁrms, whereas
the lowest-ability women opting out may signal gender-based discrimination.
2.5.1 Predicted Earnings
A woman's reported earnings at the time of the surveys are a poor meausure of whether she
is potentially high-earning, as they are potentially the equilibrium outcome of current and prior
family and labor supply decisions. I thus begin by constructing a measure of potential earnings
for women. This is intended to approximate the woman's earnings if she had worked full-time
since graduation from law school without any reduced hours or job interruptions. I then use this
measure to examine how career and family tradeoﬀs vary by a woman's earnings potential.
I predict earnings potential as a function of law school characteristics and ﬁrst-year job char-
acteristics and earnings. Because men in this sample have virtually no labor force participation
reductions and report almost no career interruptions (Table 2.4), they provide excellent proxies
for as if of full labor force participation. Moreover, the analysis of the gender gap in earnings
from the previous section indicated that diﬀerences in observables, rather than coeﬃcients, ex-
plain the diﬀerences in earnings between men and women. I thus estimate a model of earnings
in the survey year as a function of law school and ﬁrst year characteristics using the data from
male respondents and set a woman's potential earnings to be her expected earnings given these
estimates.
Speciﬁcally, I estimate
yi = β0 + β1yi1 + γ′Fi + δ′Li + ν′Pi + α′Ui +ω′Xi + ι′Djdyr + ei
where yi is log earnings at the time of the survey, yi1 is log earnings the ﬁrst year after
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law school graduation, Fi are indicators for the type of ﬁrst job (law ﬁrm, corporate, or govern-
ment/public service), Li are law school performance measures including law school GPA, LSAT
percentile, and whether a transfer, Ui are undergraduate GPA and institution, Xi are individual
characteristics including age, age squared, and ethnicity, and Djdyr is a vector of graduation-year
ﬁxed eﬀects.
Considerations of career and family may still systematically bias this estimate of earnings
potential if women alter their school performance and choice of ﬁrst job in anticipation of the
marriage market or of the demands of having children (see for example Benson (2011)). While
women have lower law school GPAs than their male counterparts, they are almost equally likely
to have a ﬁrst job in a private ﬁrm (58.99% for men vs. 54.88% for women). They are also
equally likely to report a long-term career plan of working at a large law ﬁrm (26.16% of men vs.
26.28% of women) which is one of the most lucrative and demanding career paths for elite law
graduates. Along these dimensions, the women graduates match men graduates in their career
ambitions.
Estimates of the earnings equation are given in Table 2.13. Log ﬁrst year earnings, type of
ﬁrst job, law school GPA, and undergraduate GPA strongly and signiﬁcantly predict both ﬁve and
15 year earnings. Including ﬁrst-year earnings and job type adds substantial explanatory power
to the regression even conditioning on law school performance.
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Table 2.13: Estimating Earnings Potential Using School Performance and First Job Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
5th Year 5th Year 15th Year 15th Year
Law School GPA 0.18*** 0.14*** 0.21*** 0.16***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
LSAT Percentile -0.00 -0.00 -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Undergraduate -0.04*** -0.03** -0.04** -0.03**
GPA (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Transfer 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.06
Student (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
First Job 0.11 -0.09
Corporate (0.07) (0.07)
First Job -0.25*** -0.39***
Govt/Pub Serv (0.04) (0.04)
First Job Other -0.01 -0.38***
(0.08) (0.06)
Log 1st Year 0.42*** 0.38***
Income (0.03) (0.09)
Constant 15.36*** 8.81*** 11.89*** 7.72**
(3.17) (2.85) (3.36) (3.39)
Age, Age Squared Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Undergraduate School Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2377 2377 2847 2847
R2 0.149 0.328 0.107 0.199
Outcome is log annual earnings in 2007 dollars. Signiﬁcant at: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Sample includes all male
survey respondents from the classes of 1982-2000 (5th year) and 1972-1991 (15th year) currently in the labor
force who graduated before age 31 and in less than six years. See Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions. Dummy
variables for missing values included but not reported. All regressions include year of graduation ﬁxed eﬀects.
Standard errors clustered by census region included in parentheses.
Because the earnings potential measure is estimated, standard errors reported in ordinary least
squares regressions will be incorrect. All regressions include standard errors clustered by census
region. The appropriate method would be to use a nonparametric bootstrap to compute standard
errors for all reported regressions.
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2.5.2 Trends Over Time
Later graduates of UMLS are delaying both marriage and fertility compared to their senior coun-
terparts. The fraction of both women and men that report being married and ever married
(including divorced, widowed, and separated) 15 years after graduation has not changed over the
course of the survey period (Figure 2.7). However, the fraction married for men and, particu-
larly, women prior to law school, at law school graduation, and ﬁve years after graduation has
steadily declined. Even more striking is the delay in childbearing: while the fraction of graduates
with children at the 15-year survey has remained constant over time, graduates are increasingly
delaying childbearing until more than ﬁve years after graduation (Figure 2.8).
Figure 2.7: Probability of marital outcomes by gender and graduation year. Sample includes all survey
respondents who graduated before age 31 and in less than six years. See Appendix B for variable
deﬁnitions.
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Figure 2.8: Probability of having children by gender and graduation year. Sample includes all survey
respondents who graduated before age 31 and in less than six years. See Appendix B for variable
deﬁnitions.
2.5.3 Selection in to Marriage and Spouse Choice
I begin by estimating the relationship between earnings potential, selection in to marriage, and
assortative mating conditional on marriage. In both survey waves, between 5% and 10% of the
respondents report being unmarried but having a live-in partner for whom they report occupation
and earnings data. Through this section I deﬁne marriage to be either married or in such a
cohabiting relationship.
Let mi be a marriage-related variable such as whether individual i is married or the log income
of individual i′s spouse. I estimate regressions of the form
mi = β0 + β1yˆi + β · Xi + djdyr + ei
where yˆi is individual i′s earnings potential as predicted above; Xi are controls that may include
type of undergraduate institution, race, and location characteristics in the survey year; djdyr are
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year of graduation dummies; and ei is an error. The individual characteristics Xi are controls that
may aﬀect marriage market outcomes directly as well as through earnings potential. Including
these as controls indicates to what extent they mediate the correlation between earnings potential
and the outcome of interest. Characteristics such as law school grades and LSAT scores that
should impact marriage market oucomes only through potential earnings are included only in the
estimate of earnings potential yˆi.
Tables 2.14 and 2.15 reports regressions for outcomes measured ﬁve years after law school
graduation. Both women and men with higher earnings potential are more likely to be married.
Conditional on having a spouse in the labor force, individuals with higher earnings potential have
higher-earning spouses.
Controlling for census region and city population increases the conditional correlation between
earnings potential and the probability of being married and decreases the correlation between
earnings potential and spouse earnings. Both men and women who live in very large cities
(deﬁned as a population of over three million) are ten percent less likely to be married ﬁve years
after graduation, but conditional on marriage their spouses have higher earnings. This delay of
marriage may be due to the higher density of potential partners in large cities and resulting longer
search time, or perhaps due to individuals in cities working longer hours and having correspondingly
higher earnings.
Tables 2.16 and 2.17 replicate the analysis for marriage outcomes 15 years post-graduation.
Respondents with higher earnings potential and white respondents are both uniformly more likely
to be married. Conditional on marriage, however, the correlation between earnings potential
for men and spouse earnings is no longer signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. If one assumes that
the husbands of female respondents have not changed their labor supply in response to the
demands of family or their spouses' characteristics, and hence that husband earnings are a proxy
for husband earnings potential, these results suggest that lawyers even within this elite group
are marrying assortatively on earnings potential. Because earnings are a function of both law
school performance and job choice, it is not clear to what extent search frictions or preferences
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for similarly-abled spouses with similar occupations leads to this positive assortative mating on
earnings. The positive correlation between the earnings potential of men and their wives' earnings
at ﬁve years which disappears at 15 years is most likely explained by wives of men with high
earnings potential reducing their labor supply to care for children.
2.5.4 Fertility
Most women in the sample who have children have them between the 5 and 15 year surveys:
28% of women report having children 5 years after graduation, while 70% have children 15 years
after. Table 2.19 reports correlations between having children by year 15 and the individual
characteristics of parents. Out-of-wedlock childbearing is virtually nonexistent in this sample, so I
restrict this sample to married men and women. Women and men with higher earnings potential
are no more likely to have children. However, there is a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between
a woman's fertility and her spouse's reported earnings. Women with higher-earning husbands are
more likely to report having children, and they have more children conditional on having any
(Tables 2.18 and 2.19). The coeﬃcients on spousal earnings for men have the opposite sign.
Men whose wives report lower earnings are more likely to have kids and have more of them. Given
the estimates for women, these negative coeﬃcients are mostly likely due to wives of high-earning
men reducing their labor supply to care for children.
The coeﬃcients on spouse earnings shows the impact that positive assortative mating on
earnings potential has on the fertility of women in the sample. Women with high earnings
potential are more likely to have children as the probability of having children and the number
of children are increasing in spouse earnings. In the next section I show the implications of this
increase in fertility for the labor supply of these high-ability women.
2.5.5 Labor Supply
Fifteen years after graduation, only 66% of women report working full-time in the labor force.
The primary driver of this is the presence of children: Figure 2.2 shows that a woman with one
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more children is 30% less likely to work full time than a woman who does not. In this section, I
investigate the relationship between fertility and relative earnings in determining the labor supply
of these professional men and women.
I ﬁrst estimate the correlation between labor force participation and family characteristics in
Table 2.20. Because only 1% of men report being out of the labor force in the 15 year survey,
there is no variation to explain using demographics and fertility, and coeﬃcients of the regression
of a husband being out of the labor force on his and his wife's characteristics produces nothing
of interest. A woman's probability of not currently working is increasing in the earnings of her
husband if she has children, and in the number of children conditional on having any. Spouse
characteristics have no impact on labor force participation if the couple does not have children.
Thus, women with higher earnings potential are indirectly more likely to be out of the labor force
via two channels: they have higher-earning spouses, and they have more children on average due
to their higher-earning husbands. The eﬀect of high-earning spouses on the extensive margin of
labor supply was noted for MBAs by Bertrand et al. (2010).
Table 2.21 estimates the eﬀect of earnings potential and fertility on the intensive margin of
labor supply for women reporting that they are in the labor force. I use log of hours worked per
week as the measure of current labor supply. All three of own potential earnings, spouse earnings,
and fertility are important predictors of hours worked per week. A woman's weekly labor supply
is increasing in her own expected earnings in all cases and decreasing in her spouse's earnings if
she has children. Conditional on having any children, an additional child results in a decrease in
labor supply of 11 log points. Correlations between family characteristics and and labor supply
are not mediated by demographic or location controls.
Tables 2.20 and 2.21 also estimate the relationship between labor supply and family charac-
teristics broken down by decade. On the extensive margin for women, there has been little change
over the two decades in question. The number of children has an eﬀect on the extensive margin
of labor supply only in the second decade, but controlling for age, race, and location, the eﬀect
of spouse income on the extensive margin of labor supply remains the same. On the other hand,
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the large eﬀects of respondent and spouse characteristics and fertility on hours worked per week
is only visible in the second decade of the 15 year survey. Family characteristics have no impact
on the intensive margin for women graduating in the 1970s.
Together, this table suggests that the decrease in the cost of reduced labor supply led to a
decrease in labor supply disproportionately among women with high earnings potential, who took
advantage of the decreased constraints on labor supply ﬂexibility in the later half of the survey
to purchase a bundle of high-paying work with ﬂexible labor supply, a family, and a high-earning
spouse.
2.6 The Curse of Positive Assortative Mating
If one wishes to maximize the labor force participation of workers with high human capital, the
observation of positive assortative mating amongst these highly-educated lawyers poses a bit
of a conundrum. If specialization within the family is eﬃcient, negative assortative mating on
earnings potential is the socially eﬃcient outcome (Becker, 1973). Indeed, the positive assortative
matching we observe is the marriage market outcome that minimizes the probability that the
highest-ability women remain in the labor force. Moreover, introducing family-friendly ﬂexibility
in to previously unfriendly enviroments results in reductions in labor supply by exactly the women
that we would wish to be working as much as possible. Thus, if there is some conscious tradeoﬀ
between career and family in choosing a spouse, it is confusing as to why women who invest
so much in high-quality human capital all the way through professional school would choose
combinations of spouses and fertility outcomes that would minimize their labor supply.
Examining detailed data on earnings potential, family outcomes, and marriage outcomes,
however, a new potential picture emerges. It appears that some of the highest-ability women are
using their high earnings potential to purchase a portfolio of goods which one might call career,
family, and spouse. Their high earnings potential allows them to meet, attract, and marry a
high-earning spouse. With the couple's joint high income, they can have (and have more) children
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and, if needed, the woman can choose to work part time or not at all to spend more time with
her children.
Much remains to be disaggregated in this detailed, rich data. In particular, this raises the
question of whether the women who purchase work-life balance enter law school with this in-
tention, or whether some combination of workplace time demands and the preference changes
accompanying childbirth cause them to deviate from more ambitious career paths. In addition,
these results raise an interesting question: do we see the most career-oriented women choosing to
forego rich husbands in order to be the breadwinner and leading spouse? And is this a necessary
condition to get to the top?
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Chapter 3
Evaluating Econometric Models of
Peer Eﬀects with Experimental Data
3.1 Introduction
Models of social interaction eﬀects frequently use means of peer characteristics to summarize
peer group composition (Manski, 1993; Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003; Lyle, 2007; Graham,
2008; Carrell et al., 2009). The canonical linear-in-means model of peer eﬀects popularized by
Manski (1993) continues to be almost ubiquitous in the literature as it is theoretically tractible
(Manski, 1993; Glaeser et al., 2003; Graham, 2008), computationally straightforward, and can
accomodate many discrete or continuous peer characteristics. Motivated by the observation that
a linear-in-means model with homogenous coeﬃcients implies that peer group reassignment can
have no impact on average outcomes (Hoxby and Weingarth, 2006), the linear-in-means model
has been augmented with coeﬃcients that vary by baseline ability, gender, or other characteristics
(Hoxby, 2000; Carrell et al., 2011) and higher moments of the peer baseline ability distribution
(Vigdor and Nechyba, 2007; Lyle, 2009). Recently, the mean has been used widely in network
models of social interactions (Lee, 2007; Bramoullé et al., 2009; Boucher et al., 2010).
Recent econometric and experimental results, however, suggest that these standard empirical
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models of peer eﬀects perform poorly with respect to both in-sample ﬁt and counterfactual
prediction. Carrell et al. (2011) estimate linear-in-means and linear-in-shares models of peer eﬀects
with heterogeneous coeﬃcients using data from conditionally randomly assigned peer groups at
the United States Air Force Academy. They experimentally implement the assignment of students
to groups that maximizes the predicted achievement of the lowest-ability students in the school.
Surprisingly, the low-ability students in their treatment group experience a statistically signiﬁcant
decrease in average performance compared to low-ability students in control (randomly-assigned)
groups. Survey evidence suggests that the experimentally implemented peer groups reduced
the opportunity for study partnerships between low-ability and middle-ability students, to the
detriment of the low-ability students. In a concurrent literature, Imberman et al. (2009) and
Hoxby and Weingarth (2006) use large natural experiments to nonparametrically estimate and
perform speciﬁcation tests for a variety of peer eﬀects models; they reject linear-in-means models
in favor of models in which all students beneﬁt from homogenous classmates.
Despite the ﬂourishing of both of these literatures, there has thus far been no systematic
evaluation of which, if any, reduced-form peer eﬀects speciﬁcations might accurately predict out-
of-sample the impact of altering peer group assignment on outcomes. Following the seminal
work of LaLonde (1986) and Dehejia and Wahba (2002), I use experimental data to perform
such a comparison. Duﬂo et al. (2011) measure the impact of teacher incentives and classmate
homogeneity on student achievement in a set of 121 elementary schools in Western Province,
Kenya. Half of the schools in their sample were randomly selected to have two ability-tracked
second grade classes (tracking or treatment schools), while the other half assigned students
randomly to two classes per school (non-tracking or control schools). Duﬂo et al. (2011) found
unambiguous evidence in favor of homogenous classes: students in both the top and bottom half
of the within-school ability distribution showed statistically signiﬁcant gains in endline test score
from tracking. However, linear-in-means estimates from the randomly-assigned control group
imply that tracking would be harmful to students in the bottom half of the ability distribution.
Duﬂo et al. (2011) reconcile these results with a theoretical production function that combines
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direct peer eﬀects generated by an increasing-in-means model with nonmonotonic indirect peer
eﬀects stemming from teacher responses to changes in class composition.
The theoretical framework of Duﬂo et al. (2011) relies crucially on functional form assump-
tions, and an experimenter with only the control group data would have diﬃculty estimating the
indirect peer eﬀects function and thus predicting the impact of reassignment on outcomes. I
thus approach their experimental data with two, more reduced-form, questions. First, among
both popular and non-standard econometric models of peer eﬀects, which models would have
best predicted the observed treatment eﬀect from altering peer group composition? Second,
would these models have been selected by standard model selection criteria? my approach is not
as theoretically founded as that of Duﬂo et al. (2011): it does not distinguish between direct
and indirect peer eﬀects or explicitly model teacher response to class composition. However, it
may be more applicable for experimental design, as inferring the impact of reassignment from
randomly-assigned classes using reduced-form estimates has a long history in the peer eﬀects lit-
erature (Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003; Lyle, 2007; Carrell et al., 2009; Lyle, 2009; Carrell
et al., 2011).
I begin by using local linear regression to nonparametrically estimate the relationship between
peer group composition and outcomes using data from the control schools and several diﬀerent
sets of summary statistics for peer group composition. The mean and standard deviation of peer
baseline ability predict large losses from tracking for students in the bottom half of the ability
distribution, while simple share-based nonparametric models have predictions that vary widely
based on the number of student types speciﬁed. The median and interquartile range of peer
baseline ability estimate that all students beneﬁt from having more homogenous peers, which is
consistent with the experimental outcome. The selection of summary statistics for peer group
composition, largely taken for granted in the literature, thus appears to be a crucial step in
choosing a peer eﬀects model.
I then estimate a set of ﬂexible linear speciﬁcations for each set of summary statistics above
on the data from randomly-assigned classes. I ﬁnd that a simple linear model using the median
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and interquartile range of peer baseline ability best predicts the experimental outcome, while the
standard linear in moments model predicts large losses from tracking for low-ability students.
Allowing coeﬃcients to vary by initial ability or adding higher order terms worsens out-of-sample
predictive accuracy and in some cases renders the peer group composition variables not statistically
signiﬁcant. Likelihood-based model selection criteria including the Bayesian information criterion
have some success in selecting the models that best predict outcomes out of sample. Finally, I
document the sensitivity of treatment eﬀect predictions to summary statistic choice by varying
the decile range used to measure peer ability dispersion.
my paper thus serves as a LaLonde-style warning about the precariousness of peer eﬀects
estimates and the need for the development of ﬂexible peer eﬀects speciﬁcations that perform well
both in and out of sample. Theoretical models of peer eﬀects vary widely in their implications for
the impact of peer group composition on outcomes (Lazear, 2001; Hoxby and Weingarth, 2006).
my analysis shows that in the absence of a clear choice of structural model of peer eﬀects, the
choice of how to summarize peer group composition in a reduced-form peer eﬀects speciﬁcation
is not an innocuous one. Models that ex ante seem interchangeable provide opposing predictions
of the impact of tracking on outcomes. Outlier-robust summary statistics and likelihood-based
model selection criteria perform well in this setting; verifying the superior performance of these
techniques in other settings is a worthy future endeavor.
my paper adds to an existing literature on speciﬁcation choice in peer eﬀects models. Graham
et al. (2009, 2010) develop an innovative set of frameworks to estimate nonparametrically the
impact of peer group composition on outcomes. Their classroom framework assumes that each
individual is characterized by a binary characteristic, thus eliminating the decision of how to
summarize peer group composition. Cascio and Schanzenbach (2007) compare a variety of
summary statistics for peer group composition in the context of estimating the impact of the
age distribution of a student's peers on outcomes. More generally, Manski (2011) establishes a
framework for measuring treatment eﬀects when the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption
does not hold.
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3.2 Data of Duﬂo et al. (2011)
3.2.1 Data Description
Duﬂo et al. (2011) experimentally measure the impact of class composition on the achievement
of elementary school students in Western Province, Kenya. 121 elementary schools were provided
funds by the World Bank to hire a second second-grade teacher. Duﬂo et al. (2011) randomly
selected 61 schools to have two classes to which students were randomly-assigned within the
school (non-tracking or control schools); in the remaining 60 schools, students were assigned
to a high or low ability class based on their previous year's performance (tracking or treatment
schools). Classes were randomly-assigned to facilities, including teachers, within schools. After
eighteen months, a standardized end-of-year comprehensive written and oral examination was
administered to students in all schools in the sample. For a more detailed description of the
experiment and data, see Duﬂo et al. (2011).
Table 3.1 gives summary statistics for individual and class-level variables for the tracking and
control schools. Individual characteristics observed are each student's class assignment, age at
endline, gender, baseline exam score, and endline exam score. Baseline scores are available for
48 control schools and all 60 tracking schools; they are not comparable across schools and are
are normalized to have zero mean and unit variance in each school. Endline test scores are
comparable across all schools; scores are normalized so that control school outcomes have mean
zero and unit variance. Tracking classes have on average 30 students with nonmissing baseline
scores, while control classes have approximately 28.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show graphically the change in peer group composition, as measured by
baseline test scores, induced by the experiment. Summary statistics for several measures of peer
group composition are given in Table 3.1. Because scores are standardized by school and classes
are randomly assigned within schools, identiﬁcation in the control group is obtained from random
variation in the split of below-average and above-average students within each school. 1
1An alternate approach would be to exploit variation in baseline scores both within and between schools. Such
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Figure 3.1: Change in class composition induced by the experiment. Summary statistics are for 48
non-tracking and 60 tracking schools for which baseline test score is nonmissing.
an approach would require more information on the composition of baseline scores than is currently available.
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Figure 3.2: Change in class composition induced by the experiment. Summary statistics are for 48
non-tracking and 60 tracking schools for which baseline test score is nonmissing.
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3.2.2 Experimental Results
Table 3.2 reproduces the main results of Duﬂo et al. (2011) measuring the impact of tracking on
students' endline test scores. The baseline speciﬁcation is
Yi = β0 + β1 · Ti + X′i · β+ νi
where Yi is endline test score, Ti = 1 if student i is in a tracking school, and Xi are baseline
test score percentile, age, and gender. Estimates are reported in Column 2. Controlling for
pretreatment characteristics, students in tracking schools exhibit endline test scores that are on
average 0.17 standard deviations higher than students in control schools, which is statistically
signiﬁcant from zero at 1%. Column 3 allows for heterogeneous treatment eﬀects by whether the
student was above or below the median baseline score in her school. I estimate the speciﬁcation
Yi = α0 + α1 · Ti + α2 · bi + α3 · Ti · bi + X′i · α+ ei
where bi = 1 if the student was above her school's median baseline test score. Students both
above and below the baseline median show statistically signiﬁcantly higher endline test scores in
tracking schools (0.15 standard deviation gain for students in the bottom half and 0.18 standard
deviation gain for students in the top) and I cannot reject that the magnitude of the eﬀect is
the same for students above and below the baseline median. Table 3 of Duﬂo et al. (2011) (not
replicated here) tests for heterogeneity in the impact of tracking by other demographics including
age and gender; they ﬁnd limited statistical evidence for heterogeneity in treatment eﬀects.
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Table 3.2: Overall Eﬀect of Tracking in Experimental Data
Endline Test Score
(1) (2) (3)
Tracking School 0.14* 0.17*** 0.15**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Tracking School 0.03
x Top Half Initial Distribution (0.10)
Individual Controls No Yes Yes
F Test: Coeﬀ (Tracking Variables) = 0 3.85**
p value 0.02
F Test: Coeﬀ (Bottom) = Coeﬀ (Top) 0.10
p value 0.75
Number of Observations 5795 5269 5135
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.24 0.25
This table replicates portions of Duﬂo et al. (2011), Table 2a. Signiﬁcant at: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Dependent
variable is endline test score, rescaled to have zero mean and unit variance in the non-tracking sample. Controls
not reported are baseline test score percentile, age at endline, and gender. Regression 3 include a dummy for being
above the school baseline median score. Ordinary least squares standard errors clustered by school are included
in parentheses.
3.3 Peer Eﬀects Framework
In this section I present a simple conceptual framework based on Graham et al. (2010) which
nests most models of peer eﬀects in the literature. Consider a population of students, indexed
by i, each with a vector of observable characteristics Xi drawn from population distribution fX.
The students are randomly assigned to class groups of size N and classes are randomly assigned
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to facilities conditional on some subset Xˆ of X, thus satisfying a conditional version of double
randomization (Graham 2008). I observe M randomly-selected classes and an outcome Yi for
each student after participation in her assigned class.2
I assume that the production function can be written as
Yi = g(Xi) + h(Zi, FZ−i) + ei
where E(Yi|X = Xi) = g(Xi) is student i's expected outcome given her own observables and
the conditional double randomization assignment above, Z is some subset of the observables
X, FZ−i is the empirical distribution of the Z of i
′s classmates, and E(h(Zi, FZ−i)|Xi) = 0.
The function h(Zi, FZ−i) is the peer eﬀects production function. It is the diﬀerence between i
′s
expected outcome given peer distribution FZ−i and her expected outcome given a class randomly
drawn from fx conditioning on Xˆ. I make no a priori assumptions about the form of h except
that the peer eﬀects are distributional (Manski, 2011): any impact of peer group composition,
including both direct and indirect eﬀects, operates through the distribution of Z−i. Implicit in
this speciﬁcation is that peers are exchangeable conditional on Z. For further discussion of the
assumptions underlying this speciﬁcation, see Appendix C.1.
The variables Z can be thought of as the subset of variables that the researcher believes
impact the achievement of a student's peers. For example, if X includes both academic and
demographic variables, Z may be only the academic variables, or Z may be a subset of both
demographic and academic variables. In relatively small peer groups the use of Z−i excluding i
may induce a mechanical negative bias in estimates; see Lyle (2007).
Following Table 4 of Duﬂo et al. (2011), I assume that g is linear and that Z is the baseline
test score. I can thus write the outcome as
Yi = β0 + X′i · β+ h(Zi, FZ−i) + ηs + ei
2In my data classes are sampled in pairs, which impacts my cross-validation procedure but makes no diﬀerence
for my estimates.
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where Xi consists of own baseline score, age, and gender, and ηs is a set of school ﬁxed eﬀects.
Note that this framework nests that of Duﬂo et al. (2011) if I assume all teachers exert the same
level of eﬀort, as I can set h to be equal to the sum of the direct and indirect peer eﬀects.
Even though Z consists of a single variable, with limited data and peer groups of moderate
size, nonparametric estimation of h is infeasible. I thus consider combinations of functional form
assumptions and summary statistics for FZ−i that allow for estimation of h.
3.4 Nonparametric Estimates of the Peer Eﬀects Pro-
duction Function
To isolate the role that summary statistic selection plays in correctly estimating h(Zi, FZ−i), I use
nonparametric regression to estimate h(Zi, FZ−i) using several diﬀerent sets of summary statistics
for FZ−i . I ﬁrst estimate the expectation of Yi given own characteristics
E(Yi|Xi, si) = β0 + X′i · β+ ηs
on the control group data and compute the residual R̂i = Yi− β̂0−X′i · β̂− η̂s. Figure 3.3 plots
the local linear regression of R̂i on the mean and standard deviation of peer baseline score for
students below (left) and above (right) the median of the baseline score. Details of the estimation
procedure are given in Appendix C.2. I can immediately see that the outcomes of both low and
high ability students are monotonically increasing in mean peer ability, while standard deviation
has little eﬀect. This simple plot leads to a striking conclusion: a model using the mean and
standard deviation of peer baseline scores as summary statistics for FZ−i would predict large
losses from tracking for students in the bottom half of the baseline distribution, in contrast to
the experimental result that tracking improved outcomes for bottom students.
Figure 3.4 plots R̂i as a function of the median and interquartile range of peer baseline scores.
While peer median has little impact on outcomes, outcomes are decreasing in peer baseline
interquartile range for both low and high ability students. This is consistent with the experimetal
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ﬁnding that tracking schools, which have more homogenous classes, have higher endline test
scores on average for all students.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 model R̂i as a function of the share of peers in quantiles of the baseline
ability distribution. Predictions from these models are inconsistent: while the estimates using the
fraction peers above the median produces estimates of plausible sign for the top students, they
indicate peer group composition has little eﬀect on outcomes of bottom students. Estimates
using fraction peers in the top and bottom third of the baseline distribution indicate that tracking
would decrease the outcomes of all students.
3.5 Parametric Models of Peer Eﬀects
I next estimate a series of ﬂexible linear models using the summary statistics discussed in the
previous section and the data from the control schools. These parametric speciﬁcations are easier
to compute than the nonparametric estimates in the previous sections and allow easy comparisons
of in sample ﬁt and out of sample predictive accuracy.
3.5.1 Moment-Based Models
Table 3.3 reports estimates of moment-based models. my baseline speciﬁcation is the canonical
linear-in-means model (Manski, 1993; Duﬂo et al., 2011, Table 4)
Yi = β0 + β1 · Z−i + Xi · β+ ηs + ei
where Z−i is the mean baseline test score for the classmates of individual i, Xi is own baseline,
age, and gender, and ηs is a school dummy. Estimates are given in Column 1. A one standard
deviation increase in peer mean ability increases expected endline test score by 0.04 standard
deviations, which is signiﬁcant at 5%.
Column 2 interacts peer mean baseline score with whether the student was above or below
the baseline median score. The coeﬃcient on mean peer baseline score is larger for students in
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the bottom half of the ability distribution and is signiﬁcant at 5%. Peer standard deviation is
not statistically signiﬁcant (Columns 3 and 4) and does not alter the coeﬃcient or signiﬁcance
of peer mean. Adding higher order terms (Columns 5 and 6) renders the peer group composition
variables individually and jointly not statistically signiﬁcant.
The persistent positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on peer mean baseline score in models
without higher order terms conﬁrms the conclusion from the nonparametric estimates that a
model including peer mean baseline score unambiguously predicts losses from tracking for bottom
students. I address formal prediction of treatment eﬀects in the next section.
3.5.2 Share-Based Models
Share-based models are frequently used to avoid parametric assumptions about the peer eﬀects
production function and to detect nonlinearities (Sacerdote 2001; Hoxby and Weingarth 2006;
Carrell et al. 2011). Let bi = 1 if student i's baseline score was above the median of the baseline
ability distrbution, t1i = 1 if i was in the bottom third, and t3i = 1 if i was in the top third.
Column 1 of Table 3.4 reports estimates of the model
Yi = β0 + β1 · b−i + β2 ·
(
b−i
)2
+ X′i · β+ ηs + ei
where again Xi is baseline score, age, and gender.3 β1 and β2 are individually and jointly
statistically signiﬁcant at 5%. Including interaction terms between student above/below the
baseline median and the peer composition variables (Column 2) conﬁrms the ﬁndings of the
nonparametric estimates that high ability students signiﬁcantly beneﬁt from more homogenous
peer groups while bottom students show no response to peer group composition.
Columns 3 through 6 use fraction peers in the top and bottom third of the baseline distribution
to characterize the peer ability distribution. Column 3 gives estimates of the baseline speciﬁcation
3In models omitting the squared peer variable, fraction peers above the median is not statistically signiﬁcant
for any baseline ability. I omit this speciﬁcation to save space.
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Yi = β0 + β1 · t1,−i + β2 · t3,−i + X′i · β+ ηs + ei
Both peer variables are weakly signiﬁcant with negative coeﬃcients. Adding higher order terms
and below/above the median interactions, the most striking ﬁnon outcomes ding is that increasing
the fraction of peers in the top third of the baseline distribution appears to have a signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect on all students and, in particular, students below the median. This again contradicts
the experimental evidence discussed earlier as well as the estimates in Columns 1 and 2.
3.5.3 Quartile-Based Models
Finally, I estimate models using quartiles of the peer baseline score distribution. Table 3.5,
Columns 1 and 2 report regressions using the median peer baseline score only. The median is not
statistically signiﬁcant. Column 3 reports
Yi = β0 + β1 · µ1/2(Z−i) + β2 · (µ3/4(Z−i)− µ1/4(Z−i)) + X′i · β+ ηs + ei
where µ1/2(Z−i) is the median of Z−i and µ3/4(Z−i) and µ1/4(Z−i) are the upper and lower
quartiles, respectively. While the median is still not statistically signiﬁcant, the coeﬃcient on
interquartile range is negative, large, and statistically signiﬁcant at 1%. A one standard deviation
increase in interquartile range implies a 0.09 standard-deviation decrease in endline test score.
Column 4 interacts the peer group composition variables with above/below the baseline median
indicators; the coeﬃcient on interquartile range is negative and statistically signiﬁcant for both
bottom and top students, and I cannot reject that the coeﬃcients are equal. Estimates in Column
5 and 6 including higher order terms and interactions suggest that the relationship between
interquartile range and outcome may be quadratic.
Together, the estimates from linear models suggest that both summary statistic selection and
functional form assumptions inﬂuence whether a researcher would ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant peer
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eﬀects in this data. I now use the outcomes from the tracking schools to compare the predictive
accuracy of these models.
3.6 Measuring Fit
3.6.1 Predicted Treatment Eﬀects and Prediction Error
I use the estimates from Tables 3.3 through 3.5 to predict the net impact on endline test scores of
switching from randomly-assigned to tracked classes. This is a particularly demanding challenge
for the models since they will be predicting outcomes for class compositions outside the domain
on which they were estimated.
Recall that I assume the expectation of the outcome Y is given by
E(Yi|Xi, FZ−i , si) = β0 + X′i · β+ h(Zi, FZ−i) + ηs
I consider the counterfactual in which each school with randomly-assigned classes is reorganized
so that students above the median ability are in one class and below the median are in the other.
Given the baseline ability distribution in each school, it is straightforward to compute the class
summary statistics for these counterfactual treatment schools. Let F¯Z−i be the distribution
of i′s hypothetical classmates' characteristics resulting from this reassignment. The expected
gains for a student with characteristics X in school s switching from randomly assigned classes
to tracked classes is thus
E(Yi|Xi, si, Ti = 1)− E(Yi|Xi, si, Ti = 0)
= E[h(Zi F¯Z−i)|Xi, si, Ti = 1]− E[h(Zi, FZ−i)|Xi, si, Ti = 0]
Since all peer variables either have pooled coeﬃcients or are interacted only with own position
above or below baseline median and Z is standardized within school, I can simplify this to
E[h(bi, F¯Z−i)|bi, Ti = 1]− E[h(bi, FZ−i)|bi, Ti = 0]
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Because schools are randomly chosen to have randomly assigned or tracked classes, this is straight-
forward to estimate from sample means using an estimate of h(bi, FZ−i) from the control group
data and the class compositions in the tracking and control schools. Standard errors are computed
using the Delta method.
Table 3.6 reports predicted treatment eﬀects for the eighteen models in Tables 3.3 through
3.5. The experimental gains from tracking are included at the bottom of the table for comparison.
It is easy to see that the models provide very diﬀerent estimates of the impact of tracking on
outcomes. Of models without higher order terms, almost every moment-based model predicts
large, statistically signiﬁcant losses from tracking for bottom students. The predictions of models
using the fraction of peers above the median have the correct sign and signiﬁcance; however, the
predictions are an order of magnitude too large. The other shares-based models, using fraction
in the top and bottom third, report either no or only a weakly statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of
switching class assignment regimes. The models that produce estimates that most closely match
the experimental estimates are models including median and interquartile range. Models including
higher order terms and interactions give predictions with very large standard errors so estimates
are either not statistically diﬀerent from zero or are far too large.
Table 3.7 reports the root mean squared prediction error for each model in Tables 3.3 through
3.5. The prediction error is computed by estimating the models on the control data and predicting
the outcomes in the treatment schools. Again the models vary widely in their predictive accuracy.
Models using the median and interquartile range without higher order terms have the lowest
prediction error, while models with higher order terms have large errors, most likely due to
overﬁtting.
3.6.2 Model Selection Criteria
While the experimental data allows us to measure the predictive ability of the estimated models,
I may wish to ask whether I could have determined the best model using only the data from the
control schools. In Table 3.7 I report the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and the root mean
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squared error for leave-one-school-out cross-validation, for the control group estimates. Cross-
validation is performed by estimating each model on data from 47 control schools and using the
estimates to predict outcomes for the omitted school. This is repeated leaving each school out
once.
I see that the choice of model selection criterion has some impact on whether the most
accurate model is chosen. The pooled median-interquartile range model, which had the pre-
dictions closest to the experimental estimates and the lowest prediction RMSE, has the lowest
BIC value. The Akaike information criterion (not reported) selects this model as well. However,
cross-validation selects models that have very poor predictive power: the model with the lowest
cross-validation RMSE is the shares model with interactions which predicts that tracking has no
impact on outcomes, followed by the model using the mean which predicts losses from tracking
for bottom students.
3.7 Sensitivity Analysis
Using the mean and standard deviation to describe peer group composition assumes that peer
characteristics are normally distributed; in a relatively small group such as a classroom, this
assumption can easily be violated. Here, I investigate the sensitivity of peer eﬀects estimates to
changes in the measures of mean and dispersion used in the model.
In Table 3.8 I use diﬀerences in peer score deciles to systematically vary the fraction of peers
included in the measure of peer group dispersion. I estimate models of the form
Yi = β0 + β1 · µ1/2(Z−i) + β2 · (µ(5+k)/10(Z−i)− µ(5−k)/10(Z−i)) + X′i · β+ ηs + ei
using the control school data, where µ1/2(Z−i) is the median of peer baseline scores, µj/10(Z−i)
is the jth decile of i′s peer baseline scores, and k = {1, . . . 5}. As k increases, a higher fraction
of peers are included in the dispersion measure and outliers should have a larger impact.
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Table 3.8: Models Using Alternate Measures of Peer Ability Dispersion
Endline Test Score
Peer Baseline Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Median 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03
(0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
60th - 40th percentiles -0.25**
0.10
70th - 30th percentiles -0.27***
(0.08)
80th - 20th percentiles -0.32***
(0.08)
90th - 10th percentiles -0.14*
(0.08)
Range 0.09**
(0.04)
F Test: Coeﬀ (Peer Vars.) = 0 3.18** 6.19*** 9.01*** 1.82 2.99*
p value 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.06
BIC 5172.1 5165.3 5153.1 5172.1 5172.8
Cross-Validation RMSE 0.8799 0.8780 0.8826 0.8835 0.8810
Prediction RMSE 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.93
Predicted Treatment All 0.05** 0.13*** 0.26*** 0.17* -0.13**
Eﬀects (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05)
Above 0.07 0.14* 0.23*** 0.16 -0.07
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)
Below 0.03 0.13* 0.28*** 0.17 -0.19**
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10)
Number of Observations 2179 2179 2179 2179 2179
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
Signiﬁcant at: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. The best (smallest) score for each measure of ﬁt is underlined. Sample
is 48 schools with randomly-assigned classes and nonmissing baseline scores. Dependent variable is endline test
score, rescaled to have zero mean and unit variance. All regressions include own baseline score, age at endline,
gender, and school ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors clustered by class are included in parentheses. For details on
computing predicted treatment eﬀects, see Table 3.6. For details on computing measures of model ﬁt, see Table
3.7.
The 70-30 and 80-20 measures of dispersion provide the best estimates of the peer eﬀects
production function. The coeﬃcient on the dispersion measure is highly signiﬁcant and the esti-
mates of gains from tracking are of the correct sign, appropriate magnitude, and are statistically
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signiﬁcant. Using the 70th and 30th or 90th and 10th deciles produces the smallest prediction
RMSE, while estimates using the 80th and 20th percentiles have the lowest BIC and predict gains
from tracking that are statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
As the fraction of data in the dispersion measure increases, however, the predictive accuracy
of the models decreases. Using the 90-10 range predicts overall gains from tracking that are
barely signiﬁcant at 10%, while the model using the range predicts statistically signiﬁcant losses
from tracking for all students. The coeﬃcient on the range is signiﬁcant at 5% but of the wrong
sign.
Together, these estimates demonstrate the sensitivity of peer eﬀects predictions to the exact
speciﬁcation chosen for estimation. Both model selection criteria would have chosen models with
decent predictive accuracy from this set; however, arbitrarily choosing a speciﬁcation without
using model selection criteria could easily result in estimates of the wrong sign.
3.8 Conclusion
I use the experimental data of Duﬂo et al. (2011) to test the ability of popular reduced-form
models of peer eﬀects to predict the impact of peer group reassignment on outcomes. I ﬁnd that
both the choice of summary statistics for peer group composition and functional form assumptions
are important for the detection of peer eﬀects and out of sample predictive accuracy of estimates.
Using moments as summary statistics for peer group composition leads to incorrect predictions of
the impact of tracking on outcomes, while speciﬁcations using robust descriptive statistics such
as the median and interquartile range perform more reliably. Seemingly arbitrary changes in the
summary statistics used to describe class composition result in peer eﬀects estimates of opposite
sign. Likelihood-based model selection criteria provide some suggestive ex-post guidance on the
most accurate model.
While no peer eﬀects speciﬁcation will be universally superior for all applications, the wide
range of counterfactual estimates produced by popular peer eﬀects speciﬁcations in this setting
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is alarming to the applied researcher. The development of ﬂexible reduced-form peer eﬀects
speciﬁcations as well as tests for selecting among speciﬁcations in diﬀerent empirical contexts is
a topic that deserves further study in the agenda of reconciling the theoretical and empirical peer
eﬀects literatures.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is standard in the literature Browning et al. (2011). Each agent's utility is ui(ci, e, 1K) =
ci · G(e+ γ · 1K) and the total utility of a couple with income y is ηij(y, 1K) = maxe(y− e) ·
G(e+ γ · 1K). By the envelope theorem ∂ηij∂y = G(q∗(y)). Since q∗(y) is increasing in y and G
is increasing in q, ηij(y+ γ · 1K) is convex in y.
A.2 Proofs for Section 1.4
Let subscript H denote an individual in occupation Hi and L denote an individual in occupation
Lo. Hi marry Hi if and only if
ηHH + ηLL ≥ ηHL + ηLH (A.1)
For a couple consisting of man with wage wi and woman with wage wj, re-write their marital
surplus as f (yij) where yHH = max{w2 f (1− τ) +w2m + γ,w2 f +w2m}, yLH = max{w2 f +
w1(1− τα ) + γ,w2 f (1− τ) + w1 + γ,w2 f + w1}, yHL = w2m + w1(1− τ) + γ, and yLL =
w1(2− τ) + γ.
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A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Equation A.1 can be rewritten as f (wˆ2 f +w2m)− f (wˆ2 f +w1) ≥ f (wˆ1 +w2m)− f (w1 + wˆ1)
where wˆi = max{wi(1− τ) + γ,wi}. Since wˆ2 f ≥ wˆ1, this holds by the convexity of f .
A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 1
When men Lo have comparative advantage in home production when married to women in
occupation Hi, there is a continuous cutoﬀ function αˆ(τ) such that for α > αˆ, negative assortative
matching on occupation is stable and for α ≤ αˆ, positive assortative matching is stable.
The condition for positive assortative matching can be rewritten as f (yLH) ≤ ηHH − (ηHL−
ηLL). Fixing τ, the right hand side of this inequality is constant. When men in occupation Lo
provide childcare, yLH, and thus the left hand side, is continuous and strictly increasing in α.
Thus, for each value of τ, there is a cutoﬀ αˆ such that for α > αˆ, negative assortative matching
is stable and for α ≤ αˆ, positive assortative matching is stable. Note tha αˆ may be greater than
1, in which case positive assortative matching is stable for all values of α ∈ [0, 1]. The continuity
of αˆ follows from the continuity of f .
The cutoﬀ αˆ is 1) increasing in τ when τ > γw2 f and 2) decreasing in τ when τ ≤
γ
w2 f
and
the derivative f ′ is convex.
Totally diﬀerentiating and rearranging the surplus condition that determines the equilibrium
matching gives
∂αˆ
∂τ
=
−w2 f f ′(yHH)− w1 f ′(yLL) + w1 f ′(yHL)− ∂yLH∂τ f ′(yLH)
f ′(yHL)
∂yLH
∂αˆ
It is suﬃcient to sign the numerator. When women Hi have no child, the ﬁrst term of the
numerator is 0 and ∂αˆ∂τ > 0. If f
′ is convex then f ′(yLH) = m · f ′(yHH) + (1− m) · f ′(yLL)
and f ′(yHL) = n · f ′(yHH) + (1− n) · f ′(yLL). Substituting this in to the numerator gives
−w2 f f ′(yHH) − w1 f ′(yLL) + w1 f ′(yHL) − ∂yAL∂τ f ′(yLH) ≤ [w1n + w2 fm − w2 f ] f ′(yHH) +
[−w1n+ w2 f (1−m)] · f ′(yLL) < 0
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yLH is continuous but not diﬀerentiable at τ = α. However, it is easy to show that the
subdiﬀerential at τ = α is the interval [−w2 f , −w1α ] and the above derivative is negative for all
values in this interval.
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 2
The inequality that determines whether a man invests and enters occupation Hi can be written
as
UH −UL + ηHm − ηL ≥ ηL + ai
where UH is the marital surplus received by a male Hi, UL the marital surplus received by a male
Lo, ηHm is the outside option for a male Hi and ηL is the outside option for a (male or female)
Lo. The left hand side of this inequality can be referred to as the gains to entering occupation
Hi for a man. Note that the individual subscripts are no longer necessary because payoﬀs depend
only on occupation.
The gains to entering occupation Hi can be re-written in terms of the total utility of couples.
Without loss of generality, assume that positive assortative mating is the stable matching and
men lawyers outnumber women lawyers. Then UH − UL = ZHL − ZLL where Z is marital
surplus and ηHL − ηLL = ZHL + ηHm + ηL − ZLL − ηL − ηL = UH −UL + ηHm − ηL is the
gains to becoming Hi and the cutoﬀ ability type that invests in schooling is a∗i = ηHL− ηLL− ηL.
The same reasoning holds for other equlibrium marriage matchings and for women.
Women Hi never outnumber men Hi.
Assume for contradiction that they do. There are two possible stable outcomes:
1) Negative assortative matching. Then, recalling the assumption that the majority of individ-
uals do not invest to beomce Hi, the total gains to Hi for a woman are given by ηLH − ηLL − ηL
and the gains to Hi for men by ηHL− ηLL− ηL. If women Hi outnumber men Hi, since the costs
of schooling are symmetrically distributed by gender, the cutoﬀ female ability type that invests
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to become a Hi must be higher than that for men:
a∗j > a
∗
i =⇒ ηLH − ηLL − ηL > ηHL − ηLL − ηL
Because women Hi and men Lo are weakly less eﬃcient in home production than women Lo,
ηLH − ηHL ≤ 0 and this cannot hold.
2) Positive assortative matching. If women Hi outnumber men Hi, the men Hi are the short
side of the market. If the cutoﬀ male ability that invests to become a Hi is ηHH − ηLH − ηL and
the cutoﬀ female ability is ηLH − ηLL− ηL, it must be that ηLH − ηLL− ηL > ηHH − ηLH − ηL.
For positive assortative mating to be stable, however, ηHH − ηHL ≥ ηLH − ηLL. Putting these
together implies that ηLH > ηHL which is easy to show is false for all parameter values and thus
women Hi cannot outnumber men Hi.
There are thus three possible equilibrium outcomes. There can be negative assortative mating
where men Hi weakly outnumber women Hi, positive assortative mating where men Hi strictly
outnumber women Hi, and positive assortative mating where there are an equal number of men
and women Hi and the surplus from Hi-Hi couples is split so as to make the investment incentives
identical for both genders.
The fraction of Hi who are women is 1) weakly decreasing in τ when positive assortative
mating is stable, women Hi have a child, and f ′ is convex; 2) increasing in τ when positive
assortative mating is stable and women in occupation Hi do not have kids; 3) increasing in α
when negative assortative mating is stable.
Let a∗j be the cost of schooling for the woman who is indiﬀerent between schooling and not
and a∗i the cutoﬀ for men. Then the fraction of Hi who are women is given by FW =
a∗j
a∗i +a
∗
j
.
Clearly in the region in which there are an equal number of men and women Hi, FW = .5. Thus
one only needs to consider the regions in which men Hi outnumber women Hi.
The derivative of FW with respect to τ is ∂FW∂τ =
∂a∗j
∂τ a
∗
i −
∂a∗i
∂τ a
∗
j
(a∗i +a
∗
j )
2 where the denominator is
clearly positive. In all cases a∗i = ηHL − ηLL − ηL and
∂a∗i
∂τ =
∂
∂τ [ηHL − ηLL − ηL]. There
are three cases for the women. 1) Positive assortative mating is stable and women Hi don't
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have kids. Then
∂a∗j
∂τ > 0 and
∂FW
∂τ > 0. 2) Negative assortative mating is stable. Then
∂FW
∂α =
∂a∗j
∂α a
∗
i −
∂a∗i
∂α a
∗
j
(a∗i +a
∗
j )
2 =
∂a∗j
∂α a
∗
i
(a∗i +a
∗
j )
2 > 0. 3) Positive assortative mating is stable and women Hi
have kids. Let f ′ be convex. Then by the deﬁnition of convexity, there exists m ∈ (0, 1) such
that
∂a∗i
∂τ ≥ −w1m( f ′(yHH)− f ′(yLL)) and
∂a∗j
∂τ ≤ −w1(1− m)( f ′(yHH)− f ′(yLL)). Then
∂a∗j
∂τ a
∗
i −
∂a∗i
∂τ a
∗
j < (
∂a∗j
∂τ −
∂a∗i
∂τ ) · a∗i ≤ (−w1( f ′(yHH)− f ′(yLL))) · a∗i < 0.
Thus, when f ′ is convex, the fraction of women FW increases from τ = γw2 f to the minimum
of τ = 0 or at the τ∗ at which the model transitions to the 50/50 equilibrium where τ∗is the
solution to ηHL − ηLL = ηHH − ηHL.
A.2.4 Proof of Theorem 3
For a change in men Hi's wages, the static is straightforward from the convexity of f as
∂αˆ
∂w2m
= f
′(yHH)− f ′(yLH)
f ′(yLH)
/ ∂pLH∂αˆ > 0. For a change in w2 f , the eﬀect on αˆ is given by
∂αˆ
∂w2 f
=
f ′(yHH)
∂yHH
∂w2 f
− f ′(yLH) ∂yLH∂w2 f
∂pAL
∂αˆ
. If women Hi do not have a child then
∂yHH
∂w2 f
= 1 and this is positive by
the convexity of f . If ∂yHH∂w2 f =
∂yLH
∂w2 f
= 1− τ this also positive. If ∂yHH∂w2 f = 1− τ and
∂yLH
∂w2 f
= 1
then this is positive if
∂ηHH
w2 f
> ∂ηLHw2 f . Given τ and the convexity of f , this holds for suﬃciently
large w2m.
Increasing w2 f increases the fraction of women since ∂FW∂w2 f = a
∗
i > 0.
A.3 Proofs for Section 1.5
A.3.1 Proof of Theorem 4
The total utility generated by married couple man i and woman j can be rewritten as ηij =
f (Wi+Wj+ pij) where Wi and Wj are the full income of individuals i and j and pij is the utility
from a child minus the opportunity cost of their care. If a couple has no a child, pij = 0.
For ease of notation, I use indicator functions to represent piecewise solutions. 1A is an
indicator that is equal to 1 if the conditions for A are satisﬁed and 0 otherwise. Addition of
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indicators indicates or and multiplication indicates and.
The net gain from children for Hi-Hi couples is given by
pHH =
[
γ− w2 f τ − (1− τ)∆(1C · (1− 1F) + 1D + 1E)− (w2mα − w2 f )(τ − 1+ b)1C · 1F
]
· 1K
where C: 1− b < τ ≤ (1+ α)(1− b), D: (1+ α)(1− b) < τ ≤ 1− b+ α, E: 1− b+ α < τ
, F:
(w2m−w2 f α)(1−b)+α∆
w2m−αw2 f+α∆ ≥ τ, and K:
γ−∆(1C·(1−1F)+1D+1E)
w2 f−∆(1C(1−1F)+1D+1E) ≥ τ.
If τ ≤ 1− b, women have a comparative advantage in home production and supply all of it.
When τ > 1− b, the couple must choose between sharing home production so that the woman
can continue to work in the ﬁrm and having the woman switch to the spot market. Setting
sharing equal to the woman working in the spot market gives the boundary for region F. Note
that because I assume b ≥ w2 f+w2m−γw2 f+w2m , the cutoﬀ for not having children only binds when women
Hi work in the spot market.
The net gain from a child for woman Hi - man Lo couples is given by
pLH = [γ− w2 f τ − (1− τ)∆(1E + (1C + 1D)(1− 1A − 1B)(1− 1G))− ∆α1E(1A + 1B)
−(w1
α
− w2 f )[min{τ, α}1A + (τ − (1− b))(1C + 1D)((1− 1A − 1B)1G + 1B)]] · 1L1 · 1L2
where A: α > w1w2 f , B:
w1
w2 f
≥ α > w1w2 f−∆ , G:
(w1−w2 f α)(1−b)+α∆
w1−αw2 f+α∆ ≥ τ and
L1 :
γ− ∆(1E + (1C + 1D)(1− 1A − 1B)(1− 1G))− ∆α1E(1A + 1B)− (w1α − w2 f )α1A
w2 f − ∆(1E + (1C + 1D)(1− 1A − 1B)(1− 1G)) ≥ τ
L2 :
γ+ (w1α − w2 f )(1− b)(1C + 1D)((1− 1A − 1B)1G + 1B)
w2 f + (
w1
α − w2 f )(1C + 1D)((1− 1A − 1B)1G + 1B)
≥ τ
Note that when men Lo provide all child-related home production, the couple always has a child.
The husband still supplies home production when α > w1w2 f and the wife provides the residual if
necessary. When α ≤ w1w2 f and τ ≤ 1− b, the woman has a comparative advantage and provides
all home production. When τ > 1− b+ α, the woman provides all care if α ≤ w1w2 f−∆ and the
man provides production α if α > w1w2 f−∆ . Thus, the only thing to solve for is whether the couple
shares childcare or the woman Hi works in the spot market in the region τ ∈ (1− b, 1− b+ α]
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and α ≤ w1w2 f . Comparing opportunity costs, the couple prefers sharing to single person home
production if (1− τ)∆ > (τ − 1+ b)(w1α − w2 f ).
To compute the impact of increasing ∆ on the region of shared labor supply in Hi-Hi couples,
note that the two Hi share labor supply in the region 1c · 1F. Diﬀerentiating the cutoﬀ for 1F gives
(w2m−w2 f α)(1−b)+α∆
w2m−αw2 f+α∆ =
α[w2m−αw2 f ]b
h2 > 0 so the area in which Hi share home production increases
in ∆ when the cutoﬀ (1 + α)(1− b) does not bind, i.e. for low α. A decrease in b increases
the lower bound at which Hi-Hi couples share home production since both derivatives 1 + α or
(w2m−w2 f α)
w2m−αw2 f+α∆ are positive. Analogous reasoning holds for the men Lo - women Hi couples.
A.3.2 Proof of Theorem 5
From Lemma 1, there can only be negative assortative mating if men Lo provide some home
production when married to women Hi. Thus, if women Hi always work in the spot market and
men Lo do not have binding time budget constraints, positive assortative mating is stable. It is
also easy to show that if couples with women Hi and men Lo have no kids then Hi-Hi couples
also do not have kids since the opportunity cost of childcare is weakly smaller for couples with
men Lo and women Hi.
Rearranging the equilibrium stability condition and implicitly diﬀerentiating with respect to ∆
gives
∂αˆ
∂∆
=
∂pHH
∂∆ f
′
HH − ∂pLH∂∆ f ′LH
∂pLH
∂αˆ f
′
LH − ∂pHH∂αˆ f ′HH
It is easy to see that the derivative is only non-zero in areas in which women Hi work in the
spot market or on the boundaries between this region and others. If women Hi in Hi-Hi pairs work
in the spot market and the men's time budget constraint does not bind,
∂pHH
∂∆ < 0,
∂pLH
∂∆ = 0 ,
∂pHH
∂αˆ = 0 (because Hi type men only provide home production in the sharing region when both
spouses are in the ﬁrm), and
∂pLH
∂αˆ > 0. Thus
∂αˆ
∂∆ =
∂pHH
∂∆ fHH−
∂pLH
∂∆ f
′
LH
∂pLH
∂αˆ f
′
LH−
∂pHH
∂αˆ f
′
HH
< 0. The functions pHH
and pLH are continuous. At points at which they are not diﬀerentiable it is straightforward to
check that ∂αˆ∂∆ is negative for all values in the subdiﬀerential of these two values since the sign of
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∂αˆ
∂∆ depends only on the sign of
∂pHH
∂∆ and
∂pLH
∂αˆ .
The assumption that women and men Hi who share home production and both work in the
ﬁrm always have kids (1− b ≤ γw2 f+w2m ) implies that Hi-Hi couples always have a child when
the woman can work in the ﬁrm. The cutoﬀ τˆ for which women Hi married to men Hi have no
child and positive assortative mating is stable is thus deﬁned by the equality
γ− ∆ = τˆ(w2 f − ∆)
Totally diﬀerentiating gives τˆ−1
(w2 f−∆) =
∂τˆ
∂∆ < 0 which is negative since τ < 1. The cutoﬀ αˆ
also increases as ∆ increases when women Hi do not have children. Since women Hi - men Lo
couples always have children when men Lo can provide all the childcare, and positive assortative
mating is always stable when women Hi and men Lo have no children, the cutoﬀ αˆmust occur
in the region in which men Lo spend all their time on childcare and women Hi complete the
remainder. If women Hi can do this while still working in the ﬁrm,
∂pLH
∂∆ = 0 and thus
∂αˆ
∂∆ = 0. If
women Hi must work in the spot market, then
∂pLH
∂∆ < 0,
∂pLH
∂αˆ > 0, and
∂αˆ
∂∆ > 0. Since
∂pHH
∂∆ = 0
and
∂pHH
∂αˆ = 0,
∂αˆ
∂∆ > 0.
A.3.3 Proof of Theorem 6
Recall that the fraction of Hi who are women can be written as FW =
a∗j
a∗i +a
∗
j
. The proof of
why men Hi outnumber women Hi from Theorem 2 still holds. Because cutoﬀ for investment
for men is always ai = ηHL − ηLL − ηL, their gains to Hi do not depend either on ∆ or b.
Thus ∂FW∂∆ =
(a∗i +a
∗
j )
∂
∂∆ a
∗
j− ∂∂∆ (a∗i +a∗j )a∗j
(a∗i +a
∗
j )
2 =
a∗i
∂a∗j
∂∆
(a∗i +a
∗
j )
2 . If positive assortative mating is stable,
∂a∗j
∂∆ =
∂[ηHH−ηHL−ηL]
∂∆ =
∂ηHH
∂∆ < 0 if women Hi in Hi-Hi pairs work in the spot market and
∂a∗j
∂∆ = 0
if they do not. If negative assortative mating is stable and the men's time budget constraint does
not bind, women work in the ﬁrm and thus
∂a∗j
∂∆ = 0.
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A.3.4 Proof of Theorem 7
The returns to investment for women are either ηHH − ηHL − ηL or ηLH − ηLL − ηL, while the
returns to investment for men are not functions of ∆ or b. Thus, a decrease in b increases the
fraction of women when ηHH or ηLH is a function of b , which is when b is binding and women
Hi share home production with men Lo.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 8
Since α′ < 1, men Hi never provide home production and thus are all equivalent in the marriage
market. There are two cases: α ≤ αˆ or α > αˆ.
If α ≤ αˆ, it is not proﬁtable for women Hi to marry men with productivity α and all women
Hi marry Lo with productivity α′ or men Hi. Let V denote surplus to women and U surplus to
men, and recall that Z is total marital surplus (total utility minus outside options). The increase
in marital surplus from investing to become a Hi is given by VH −VH = ZHH − ZHL (women),
UH − UL = ZHL − ZLL(men with α) and UH − UL′ = ZHH − ZL′H (men with α′). The
increased surplus given to men Lo with αi = α
′ is UL′ −UL = ZHL − ZLL − ZHH + ZL′H > 0.
Because all male Hi get the same surplus, the additional surplus gained by men Lo with
high α is lost gains to entering occupation Hi for these men. For this to be an equilibrium, the
number of men Lo with α′ must be less than the measure of women Hi. The condition for this is
q[amax − (ηLL − ηA′L − ηA)] < ηLL − ηLA − ηA. The left hand side holds for q = 0 and since
it's continuous in q it must hold for q suﬃciently close to 0. The returns to being a male Lo with
high α are increasing in α′ since ZL′H is increasing in α′.
An increase in women's wage w2 f decreases the returns to becoming a Hi for α′ if q[amax −
(ηLL− ηA′L− ηA)] > ηLL− ηLA− ηA or η′AL > η′LL. This is the same condition as in Theorem
3.
If α > αˆ then all women Hi marry men Lo. The marital surplus gains to investing and
becoming a Hi are VL − VA = ZAL − ZAA (women), UL −UA = ZLA − ZAA (men with low
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α) and UL −UA′ = ZLA − ZAA − ZA′L + ZAL (men with α′ ). The condition on q for this to
hold is
q[amax − ηLA + ηAA + ηA′L − ηAL + ηA] ≤ ηAL − ηAA − ηA
The derivative of the gains to high α men with respect to women's wages are 2w1τ( 1α − 1α′ )
. This is unambiguously positive, increasing in α′, and decreasing in α.
If ∆ > 0 and τ, α, and α′ are such that positive assortative mating and sharing is the stable
matching, only men Hi perform home production. For q suﬃciently small, men Hi with high α
are outnumbered by women Hi and thus get to keep the additional surplus they create from their
high eﬃciency. Since all men Lo receive the same surplus, men with high α have an additional
incentive to invest in becoming a Hi.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
The following notes apply to all tables and graphs.
• Graduation year: For individuals who took more or fewer than three years to ﬁnish law
school, the graduation year is set to be their self-reported social class, which usually is three
years after the year of matriculation.
 Cohort dummies: dummies for graduation year in ﬁve-year groups (1970-1975,
1976-1980, etc.)
• Undergraduate controls: includes undergraduate GPA and dummies for undergraduate
school.
 Undergraduate GPA: normalized to have mean zero and unit variance within each
graduating UMLS class.
 Undergraduate school: includes dummies for Michigan alumni, other Michigan
school, other state school, Ivy League / Seven Sisters, military, and foreign institutions.
 Ivy League / Seven Sisters: Attended college at an Ivy League or Seven Sisters
school.
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• First job: First job after graduation, or after serving as a clerk if clerkship is ﬁrst job.
Categories include law ﬁrm, corporate counsel, government / public service, and other.
• Law school performance:
 Law school GPA: Normalized to have mean zero and unit variance within each
graduating class.
 LSAT percentile: Percentile of the individual's LSAT score among all test-takers
nationally the year prior to matriculating at UMLS.
 Transfer student: entered UMLS after the ﬁrst year. Undergraduate and LSAT
information may be missing for transfer students.
• Labor supply:
 Not employed: reports currently working zero hours per week or zero weeks per
year.
 Part-time: reports working 35 or fewer hours per week, one or more weeks per year.
 Ever part-time: reports working part-time for six or more months between law school
and the survey.
 Ever not employed: reports being out of the labor force for six or more months
between law school and the survey.
• Workplace setting: includes dummies for law ﬁrm, corporate counsel, government /
public interest / legal services, and non-practice setting.
• Non-practice setting: includes dummies for judiciary, teaching, business, non-proﬁt, and
other.
• Marital status:
 Ever married: Currently married, divorced, separated, or widowed.
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 Married: Currently married or re-married. Includes cohabiting relationships in which
partner occupation and income are reported.
• Race controls: include dummies for African American, Hispanic, Asian, White, and Other.
• Location controls: dummies for current census region and population of current city of
work.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Assumptions on the Peer Eﬀects Production Func-
tion
Here we discuss the assumptions underlying the peer eﬀects speciﬁcation in Section 2. Much of
this notation and many of the assumptions in this section are taken from Graham et al. (2010).
Consider a population of individuals (students) assigned to groups (classrooms) of N
individuals each. Each student is indexed by i and each classroom is indexed by c. Let the variable
Ci indicate the group assignment of individual i: Ci = c indicates that student i is assigned to
classroom c. For brevity, denote by ci the class of student i. Student i had a pre-assignment vector
of observed characteristics Xi and unobserved characteristics Ai. Denote by Zi = (Xi, Ai) the
vector of all characteristics for individual i. Each class has group-speciﬁc characteristics Gc, such
as classroom facilities and teachers. We observe the student's performance after being in class
c; we denote this outcome Yi. Y is generated by the production function
Y = f˜ (Z,Z,C,G) + e
where Z is the vector of characteristics Z for all individuals in the population, C is the vector
of group assignments in the population, G is the vector of characteristics of all groups, E(e) = 0,
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Var(e) = σ2, and e is independent of Z,C, and G.
Student i′s outcome is independent of the characteristics Zj of students j not in i′s class, of
the assignment of individuals not in i′s class to classes, and of the characteristics of classes to
which i is not assigned. More formally,
f˜ (Zi,Z,C,G) = fˆ (Zi,Z−i,Gci)
where Z−i = {Zj|Cj = ci, j 6= i}.
This assumption eliminates general equilibrium-type eﬀects such as a population-wide grading
curve in which the composition and resources of the overall population aﬀects student i's outcome.
We next assume that only the characteristics, not the labels, of student i′s classmates aﬀect
her outcome.
The production function is exchangeable in Zj, j 6= i. That is, for any permutation Z˜−i of
Z−i,
fˆ (Zi,Z−i,Gci) = fˆ (Zi, Z˜−i,Gci)
Under this assumption of exchangeability,we can re-write the production function as
E(Yi|Zi,Z−i,Gci) = ~f (Zi, FZ−i ,Gci)
where FZ−i is the empirical distribution of Zj for the N − 1 classmates of student i. Manski
(2011) refers to social interactions of this form as distributional interactions.
Xi ⊥ Ai
This is a mechanical assumption: for any individual unobservables A∗i , we can deﬁne Ai =
A∗i − E(A∗i |Xi).
Students are randomly assigned to peer groups, and groups are randomly assigned to facilities
(including teachers), conditional on a subset X˜i of the variables Xi.
Zj ⊥ Zi|X˜i ∀j s.t. Cj = ci, j 6= i
Zk ⊥ Gc|X˜i ∀k s.t. Ck = c
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Examples of variables X˜i could include demographic variables used for stratiﬁed random as-
signment (for example in Carrell et al. (2009)) or school-level dummies. This is a generalization
of double randomization as ﬁrst introduced by Graham (2008).
Finally, we make an assumption about the sampling used which allows for straightforward
bootstrapping.
We observe a sample of M classrooms randomly drawn from the population of classrooms.
Thus, the observed data consists of vectors (Yi,Xi,Ci) for all i in the M classrooms randomly
sampled.
C.2 Local Linear Regression
The local linear regression estimates in Figures 3 through 6 are computed using a multidimensional
Epanechnikov kernel. The bandwidth is the rule of thumb bandwidth for local linear regression
of Fan and Gijbels (1996) given by
hˆROT = 1.719
[
σ˘2
´
w0(x)dx
∑ni=1{m˘2(Xi)}2w0(Xi)
] 1
5
where n is the number of data points in the sample, m˘(x) is the estimate of m(x) = E(Y|X = x)
using a quartic polynomial, m˘2(x) is the second derivative of m˘(x), σ˘2 is the sum of squared
residuals from the estimate of m˘(x), and w0(x) is the indicator function over the domain of
m(x). For more detail, see Chapters 3 and 4 of Fan and Gijbels (1996).
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